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As number of mobile devices arise, and most of them equipped with a camera, it
becomes not only easier to generate video content, but harder to identify or classify the
source of it. On this field many papers had been written, most of them exploring the PNRU
noise, with good results, even if it requires a lot of computation. This work proposes an
algorithm to cluster a set of videos based only on the information of the container of the
video, with lower computational cost than content based approaches.
Keywords: Acquisition Source Identification, Digital Video, Forensics Analysis,




Al tiempo que el nu´mero de dispositivos mo´viles aumenta, y con la mayor parte de ellos
equipados con ca´mara, es cada vez ma´s fa´cil generar contenido de v´ıdeo, pero ma´s dif´ıcil
clasificar su fuente. En este tema, existe mucho trabajo previo, la mayor´ıa explorando
el ruido PRNU, con muy buenos resultados. Pese a todo, estos me´todos tienen un coste
computacional muy elevado. Este trabajo propone un algoritmo de clustering para agrupar
un conjunto de v´ıdeos basado u´nicamente en la informacio´n del contenedor del v´ıdeo, con
un coste computacional mucho menor que los basados en ana´lisis del contenido.
Palabras clave: Identificacio´n de la Fuente de Adquisicio´n, Vı´deo Digital, Ana´lisis






As number of mobile devices arise, and most of them equipped with a camera, it
becomes easier to generate video content, and it is proved as a very effective way to
communicate [Bec15]. Forecasts present it as an increasing trend [Cis18]. It already
represents 75% of the web traffic, and this number is thought to rise to 82% by 2021.
According to Alexa ranking [Ale], YouTube is the second top site of December 2018,
adding more than 300 hours of video per minute [Asl18]. Also, on the top 20 sites we
can found seven social networks that include video ( Facebook, Qq, Twitter, Reddit, Vk,
Weibo and Instagram). Also, video surveillance is now a trend, not only at home or offices,
but also to strength public security. This is the case of London, with more than 500 000
cameras installed, or the future of Chine with the “Xue Liang” (”Sharp Eyes”) program.
Importance of video forensics is bounded to this phenomenon, as it also increases
number of video evidences in legal matters. Nevertheless, due to improvements on
computer technologies and network allows to manipulate and share video data so easily
that “digital videos and photographs can be no longer considered proof of evidence, since
their origin and integrity cannot be trusted” [MFB+12]. There is a need of tools to
authenticate video content, trace is life cycle, identify the source, etc.
Video containers contain relevant information about the source of the file. It is
important not to confuse video container information with metadata, as the former uses
specific and tamper-proof information from the structure of the video file. Most part of
the previous work focus on the analysis of the video content rather than the container,
even if this analysis is much heavier.
1.2 Context
The current Final Degree Project is part of a research project entitled RAMSES
approved by the European Commission within the Horizon 2020 Research and Innovation
Framework Program (Call H2020-FCT-2015, Innovation Action, Proposal Number:
700326) and in which the GASS Group of the Department of Software Engineering and
Artificial Intelligence of the Faculty of Computer Science of the Universidad Complutense
de Madrid participates (Group of Analysis, Security and Systems, http://gass.ucm.es,
group 910623 of the catalogue of research groups recognised by the UCM).
Apart from Universidad Complutense de Madrid, the following entities participate:
• Treelogic Telema´tica y Lo´gica Racional para la Empresa Europea SL (Espan˜a)
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• Ministe´rio da Justic¸a (Portugal)
• University of Kent (Reino Unido)
• Centro Ricerche e Studi su Sicurezza e Criminalita` (Italia)
• Fachhochschule fur Offentliche Verwaltung und Rechtspflege in Bayern (Alemania)
• Trilateral Research & Consulting LLP (Reino Unido)
• Politecnico di Milano (Italia)
• Service Public Federal Interieur (Be´lgica)
• Universita¨t des Saarlandes (Alemania)
• Direccio´n General de Polic´ıa - Ministerio del Interior (Espan˜a)
1.3 Objectives
In this work two algorithms are proposed, capable of separating videos by encoding
source, specifically by brand. To do so, the some steps were followed.
Investigation about video forensics, and video file formats
Design of a solution
Evaluation of data set representation
Evaluation of Clustering algorithms
Interpretation of the results
1.4 Related Work
There is not many work on video container analysis, as it was not introduced until
2014 by [GFK14]. This paper introduces the information contained in MP4, MOV and
AVI file formats video streams. It has no mathematical approach and it is limited to state
the differences between devices, and notice its potential for video forensics purposes.
This first work, still on very early stages, was developed by [SPC17] resulting in the
paper [ISF+19], aiming at video integrity verification and identification and classification
of the source. This last paper was the reference of this work, as it is the most developed
production on this topic.
Even if video container had never been used for forensic purposes before, a large amount
of work exists about video forensics. An overview of them is given later.
1.5 Structure
The rest of this work is divided into 5 more chapters:
Chapter 2 begins with an introduction to how video files work, and continues with an
overview of forensic video analysis. Based on the main concepts, some of the techniques
developed to cover its three main areas are detailed: Acquisition, Compression and Video
Compression. However, none of these techniques is related to video containers. From this
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point he focuses on the state of the art of video container analysis. The work of [ISF+19]
is the main theme of this chapter, since it is one of the few works on the subject, and
the most recent and advanced. This work is analysed and will be the basis of the next
chapter.
The chapter 3 contains the work proposals. It explains how to reformulating the base
of the work in [ISF+19] grouping techniques can be applied. It also details the techniques
used. One important step is the choice of the representation of the videos. These different
ways of approaching the data are the core of this work, since the adequate representation
of the data is crucial for the grouping without supervision. Finally, two algorithms are
proposed to perform the grouping.
The chapter 4 describes the experiments carried out and their results. It is divided into
two phases. It begins with an analysis of the data set in different different representations.
For this we measure the silhouette coefficient of the different representations. Finally, the
two grouping algorithms are tested using the most promising representations.
Chapter 5 concludes this work, summarizes it and defines possible improvements or




The forensic analysis of video containers had never been discuss before 2014 [GFK14],
and first mathematical came 4 years later [SPC17], as part of a thesis. This chapter
analyses the result of their work, and overall the approach they took to the data.
2.1 Video File
The following chapter peeks at digitisation of video content. Since the XIXth century,
video had been recorded in analogical support, like film, but from late XXth century, with
the uprising of computers, digital video has became a daily reality.
A video is just images along time, and maybe also audio. So there is a need of
a new file format able to manage this multimedia streams: video file formats. It is
also important to talk about video encoding, which is very related with compression.
Imagining video data as a collection of images to be displayed, and using uncompressed
images, the amount of information needed per second is huge. The formula is quite simple:
bit rate (bps) = colour depth (bits)
×vertical resolution× horizontal resolution× refresh frequency (fps)
Then doing easy maths, a depth colour of 8 bits (256 colours, VGA palette) and a
resolution of 720x576 and 25fps, similar to European TV PAL resolution, it will have a bit
rate of 83 Mbps (10 MBps). For example, the original “Star Wars: Episode IV – A New
Hope“ (121 min) will have a size of 75GB in this quality. Speaking about 1080p 60Hz,
which correspond to a Full HD television, it will be up to 1Gbps and almost 1TB for the
movie. And this is without accounting audio tracks!
2.1.1 Video File Formats
There is a common confusion in the concepts of video file, due to undistinguished use
of file formats and video codecs when they designate two very different concepts. A file
format, container or wrapper ”describes how different elements of data co-exists within
the file” [Sci17]. Figure 2.1 is a simplified representation of video file (or container or
wrapper).
Each container may allow different video or audio stream types and numbers, Table
2.1 shows some of the most common file formats that can be found in real world. The two
last ones, QuickTime and MP4 are implement an ISO standard (inspired by the Apple
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Figure 2.1: Simplified view of a video file
format), ISO/IEC 14496-12 [Int17], thus, will have a similar format, that will be reviewed
in depth in further sections.
Name Extension Container Video Encoding Audio Encoding
AVI .avi AVI Any Any
FLV .flv FLV H.264, VP6, ... AAC, MP3, ...
Windows Media Video .wmv ASF Windows Media Video, ... Windows Media Audio, ...
QuickTime .mov QuickTime Apple Video, H.262, H.264, ... AAC, MP3, ...
MPEG-4 Part 14 .mp4 MPEG-4 Part 12 H.264, MPEG-4 Part 2, ... ACC, MP, ...
Table 2.1: Some of the most popular video file formats
2.1.2 Video Codecs
That is why video codecs exists. A video codec is an “algorithm” able to code and
decode a signal, a video in this case. To reduce the size of a file, redundant information
is removed, this is called lossless encoding, but this has a limit. Once crossed, it start to
drop information, and it is called lossy encoding. Lossy encoding might introduce artifacts
on the video, but these might be negligible or tolerable. As videos are images along time,
it naturally produces two kinds of compression: spatial and temporal.
Spatial compression is the heritage of image codecs, as every frame is compressed
as an independent image. For example, JPEG image codec uses divides each frame in
blocks of pixels, then performs a chroma subsampling, transforms them using discrete
cosine transform (DCT), and at last quantization on the resulting coefficients to reduce
images sizes at 10:1 without visible effect for human eye [nas92]. These techniques are
also adopted by MPEG-1, MPEG-2 and current MPEG-4 [Int15].
Temporal compression tries to reduce redundant information in different frames. Think
of a static movie take, with only one object moving across. Only this object is interesting,
as the background is static in all the takes. To do so, the concept of Group Of Frames
(GOP) is introduced. Specifications may vary among different codecs, but in general
general line the schema is as follows:
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I-frames: known as key frames or reference frames are not temporally compressed,
so they can be “read” alone.
P-frames: known as predictive frames, they are rendered using previous I-frame
information, or they can be a standalone frame (like an I-frame) if changes are too
big.
B-frames: known as bidirectional frames, they reference the nearest I-/P-frames
forwards and backwards..
This is a general approach, for example H.264, allow B-frame to be used as reference
for P- and B- frames. This has pros and cons, as it can save space by not repeating changes
already done on previous B-frame, but penalise low quality B-frames as artifacts will be
propagated. Or MPEG-2, that imposes P-frames to only reference the single previous
I-frame while H.264 allows multiple references without concern of being the previous.
Figure 2.2: Representation of two group of frames. Arrows indicate dependencies to
rebuild the frame
The pattern of the GOP is determined by a sequence starting with an I-frame and
the following P- and B-frames before the next I-frame. In the example of Figure 2.2 the
sequence is IBBPBB. The length of this sequence, called GOP length, is the measure of
frames between two I-frames. The bigger, the most compressed the video will be, but
fast transitions will lose quality. The compromise is achieved depending on the situation:
video conferences will surely use longer GOP lengths than movies (like action movies).
2.2 Concept of Video Forensics
Three main areas may be distinguish on digital video signals forensics: acquisition,
compression and edition.
The first concerns the first steps of the content, which is usually translated in the
identification of the source of originating device. The second aims to determine the life
cycle of the content, usually translated in multiple compression of an original video content.
The last one attempts to determine if video content as suffered some kind of alterations.
But before diving in these areas some terms must be clarified, in order to clearly
understand the nuances:
Integrity: “ ensuring that the information presented is complete and unaltered from
the time of acquisition” [oDE16].
Authentication: “The process of substantiating than the data is an accurate
representation of what it purports to be” [oDE16].
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Classification: “ assign the most likely source brand from a set of known brands”
[ISF+19].
Identification: “ checking the compatibility degree of a query video with an alleged
source brand” [ISF+19].
The first two terms seem very similar in current English, but it is clear that the
integrity is a stronger condition, as any authentication violation will also compromise
integrity. Integrity is, nevertheless, sometimes negligible the integrity of a video: in real
world cases, video will usually suffer for re-compression processes (any sharing on social
networks will cause it) probably without compromising its authenticity.
As integrity is a very restrictive condition, very bounded with the origin source, it is
often needed to first asses this to have a comparison point. In order to do that a video can
be classified among a set of well known brands, or checked against video from supposed
source.
2.2.1 Acquisition
This is the main area intend to be covered in this work. The objective been to determine
which is the exact device was the generator, it can be divided it in 3 questions: the type
(CCVT, smartphone, etc), the model (brand and/or model), and then the exact device
(determine if a specific device is the responsible). Each of this steps could be relevant by
its own, as it might supply crucial information.
There have been developed many approaches using the analysis of the noise in the
video, being the PNRU the most significant because of his robustness, to extract a
fingerprint of the camera device that recorded it. This has been proven effective for images,
but is a challenging task for video due to lossy compression 2.2.2 it is often performed.
There have been nevertheless positive results for identifying the PNRU noise of a device
even on heavily compressed video form social networks as shown in [ACDM+17].
As it may have been noticed, most of this techniques are focused on the video stream
analysis, which is translated in huge volumes of information that need to be manipulated.
Added to this, thanks to the optimisation of chips manufacturing, it is possible to
manipulate and alter this videos content from a simple entry level smartphone. Not only
that but social networks, as WhatsApp, Facebook, but also Youtube and so, making
almost any video potentially unreliable.
2.2.2 Compression
As stated before, uncompressed video needs from huge amounts of space, that is why
when a video is captured (or generated in any way) it is usually encoded at the moment.
As the spectrum of file formats and encoding is so ample, each device/model/brand may
use different encodings, and thus, identifying video encoding parameters might be useful
not only trace how the video was generated or even to estimate the quality of the video
without having access to to source.
It was seen in 2.2.1 it is prevailing the re-encoding of video when uploaded to social
networks of any kind, but it also happens when a video is edited in any way. Then, the
study of the life cycle of the video may contribute to identify not only the original format
but to trace this history too.
This history of re-encoding can be helpful to trace its route, even up to the adquisition
device.
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Many of videos are loosely encoded, for example any MOV or MP4 video. This
loosely compression is very characteristic, and as a specific footprint. Some of the most
common techniques for compression do focus on detecting the size of the blocks used for
compression, and others on profiling the parameters of the quantization.
Those techniques are the same used for JPEG, as the spacial compresion on both is
equivalent. On both techniques, the job of Z Fan, RL De Queiroz et al overstands [FDQ00]
[FDQ03].
Another techniques had been developed to detect double compression, that is when
an already loosely encoded video is encoded again. Due to quantization, the histogram
of the DCT coefficients produces peaks, that can be exploited, as shown in [HLWT06].
Another approach is also based on DCT coefficients, and Bendford’s law, stating that a
double encoded video will break it, as in [FSS07].
Other techniques are focused on the temporal compression, as in [VTT10].
2.2.3 Edition
Last area is the detection of video tampering, which affects the authenticity of the
video. This might seem easier for video than for images, as it looks more complicated to
edit a video than an single frame, but removing or duplicating is a very simple task that
does not introduce any evidence of tampering in the individual frames.
To detect manipulations in video, there have been different approaches adopted.
The more intuitive one is an heritage from image authentication [Sci18], based on the
analysis of the inconsistencies of “what it is seen”, as incoherent shadows, but this will
nevertheless be a very complex task. This did not prevented some works in this direction,
identifying inpainting [ZSZ09], or analysing free-flight movement objects [COF12] to detect
manipulations.
Another approach is to trace the camera noise among the different frames and regions.
Reusing techniques used for acquisition identification of the source [MCP+07], allows to
profile the PRNU noise of each frame to look for correlation on the video. Knowledge
on this techniques also lead to the analysis of other noises, as “noise residue” [HHLH08].
Using denoising filters developed for the calculus of the PNRU [MKR99], extracting this
noise and getting its correlation between temporally adjacent blocks. Repeated frames will
rise correlation to 1, and edited ones will decrease this value, revealing and even locating
the tampered frames and pixels. It has been proven effective in uncompressed videos and
promising in compressed ones.
When a video is modified it will probably need to be re-encoded (or maybe not,
depending on the nature of the modification), and so, even if it might difficult the use
of previous techniques, it leaves a trace, as seen in section 2.2.2. For example, when
re-encoding a video, different GOP may arise and this will, with lossy encoding as MPEG,
have consequences in the P frames encoding [WF06], revealing frame deletions or additions,
or even doctoring, if only part of the video suffer this phenomena, or the video is not
supposed to have been re-encoded. Another approach tries to detect double compression
per block looking for MPEG (JPEG) quantization artifacts [WF09], allowing to detect
macro-blocks (16x16 pixels when MPEG standard is 8x8) doubly compressed. Applied
frame wise this allows to detect green screening in much cases if the quality of the
background is lower enough compared to the resulting video.
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2.3 Forensic Analysis of Video File Formats
The paper [GFK14] offers a glance at metadata contained on AVI and MOV-Based
files. It is just a first approach at the information contained in both wrappers, and how it
varies among recording devices. They use a dataset with various smartphones, cameras,
and even video editors.
2.3.1 Files Structure
MOV-Based (MP4 like) and AVI do have a similar structure for metadata: while
MP4-like rely on ”atoms”, and AVI on ”lists” and ”junk”, both present a hierarchical
structure. The standard specifications however differ: AVI is much more relaxed than
MP4, and that affects on how to use the information.
2.3.2 AVI Files
For the analysis of the AVI files the focus is on the structure of the container more than
the values. Once covered the mandatory header, the structure of the file is unrestricted,
and thus, the structure defined by ”lists” and”junk” is even more characteristic than the
values they may have.
The authors are even able to identify unique specifics for some models over they dataset.
This characteristics are potentially suitable to classify as produced by a specific camera
or editor, or at least to discard them.
2.3.3 MOV Based Files
For MOV based files, the structure is more restricted than for AVI. Nevertheless, even
if better defined, it is not completly fixed. It is still insteresting to analyse the structure
of the atoms forming the video, noticing some particularities. For example, even if usually
MP4 videos start with ftyp atom, Kodak ones start with skip atoms.
The values itself contained in the structure reveal an interest too. The authors start
with the focus on ftyp fields ”Major brand” and ”Compatible brands” with fixed values
for each class of their dataset. Even more, almost each class as its own combination of
values as shown in Table 2.2, if they have. So the ftyp information seem to be a good
starting point for video classification.
Furthermore, video encoding information reveal potential too. Authors point out
”time scale” parameter of video and audio streams, representing the frame rate and audio
sampling rate, as an example of the relevant information that can be found in the moov
atom. This atom is the one that contains the information to decode the data stream
contained in mdata, and contains specific information on video and audio encoding used.
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Model Major brand Compativle brands
Apple iPhone 4 qt qt
Benq S88 isom isom, 3g2a
BlackBerry 8310, Palm pre 3gp4 3gp5, 3gp4, isom
Canon 7D qt qt, CAEP
Google Nexus 7 3gp4 isom, 3gp4
Kodak M1063 - -
LG J990 3gp5 3gp5, 3gp4
Samsung SGH-D600 3gp5 3gp5, isom
Minolta DiMAGE Zq - -
Motorola MileStone, Samsung GT-5500i (MP4V) 3gp4 3gp4, mp41, 3gp6
Samsung GT-550i (H.263) 3gp4 3gp4, 3gp6
3GP: Nokia 6710, E61i, E65 3gp4 3gp4, 3g2a, isom
MP4: Nokia 6719, E61i, E65 mp42 mp42, 3gp4, isom
Nokia X3-00 3gp5 3gp5, 3gp4, 3g2a, isom
Praktica DC2070 - -
SonyEricsson K800i 3gp5 vfj1, 3gp4, 3gp5, mp42
FFmpeg isom isom, iso2, mp41
YAMB mp42 isom, mp42, 3gp5
Adobe Premiere CS5 3gp5 isom, 3gp3, mp41, mp42
Table 2.2: Major and compatible brands stored in the MP4 ftyp atom [GFK14]
The paper states that different video sources produce characteristics footprints in the
video file structure (both AVI and MOV based) that can exploited.
It is assumed that the characteristics manually spot are not enough to define a model.
Then, as furthers steps, it is suggested to check how this can scale in larger datasets, where
unknown file formats may appear, and use parsers to automate information extraction.
2.4 A Video Forensic Framework for the Unsupervised
Analysis of MP4-Like File Container
The paper [ISF+19] is focused only on MOV-based file, and a more automatised
approach is attempted. This paper is, nowadays, the state-of-the-art on video container
analysis.
2.4.1 Extraction and Preprocessing of Video Files
The authors use a MP4 parser [APA18] to extract atoms information from MP4-like
video. Then, observations X are build like a collection of field-values ω with an associated
path and order pX(ω). For example,
X = (ω1, ..., ωm) (2.1)
with filed-values and paths like
ω = @creationT ime : 2017− 07− 2809 : 14 : 13
pX(ω) = (moov − 4,mvhd− 1)
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Once defined the shape of the data, the authors define some formulas that will be
useful to work with this data:
Similarity between field-values
Given two videos X = (ω1, ..., ωm) and Y = (ω′1, ..., ω′n) similarity between
field-values is defined as if two field-values have the same value and path.
S(ωi, ω′j) =
{
1 if ωi = ω′j and pX(ωi) = pY (ω′j)
0 otherwise
(2.2)
Comparison between field-value and video
Given two videos X = (ω1, ..., ωm) and Y = (ω′1, ..., ω′n) the comparison of a single
ωi ∈ X with a whole other video Y as:
1X′(ωi) =
{
1 if ∃ω′j ∈ Y : S(ωi, ω′j) = 1
0 otherwise
(2.3)
This can be read as 1 if Y contains an attribute similar to ωi.
2.4.2 Video Integrity Verification
Using the structures defined the authors define a metric-like formula to measure
dissimilarity between two videos. Then, this measure is used to compare original videos
from a specific device between them, and a supposed original video. If the maximum
distance between well-known original videos is smaller than the maximum distance from
the unknown video to the original ones, the video is called tampered.
The mismatching percentage of all field-values is:





This formula is not symmetric as it is then percentage of field-values in X with a similar
one in X ′ but if the cardinality is different or there are repeated values (it is possible) it
will affect the results. In order to compensate, dissimilarity is defined as the mean of both
values:
D(X,X ′) = mm(X,X
′) +mm(X ′, X)
2 (2.5)
2.4.3 Brand Identification and Classification
In this section the authors introduce the concept of Likelihood ratio applied to videos.
The so called likelihood ratio on shullanivideo and [ISF+19] is in fact the Bayes factor of
two hypothesis given a video X = {ω1, ....ωm}:
H0 : X belongs to C (2.6)
H1 : X belongs to C (2.7)
This approach has been proven effective for DNA analysis and accepted in court [BS15],
and also called weight of evidence.
First, they denote by Ω the set of “distinct” field-values (using the formula S(•, •))
present on the universe of all videos X .
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They also define, given a class C ∈ C, the subset of videos belonging as XC , and his
complementary XC = X \ XC












This value WC(ω) is just the percentage of videos of the subset containing the field-value.
It is time to pose the key point of this approach.
Now, the core is to approximate for each ω ∈ X the conditional probabilities:
P (ω|H0) = WC(ω)
P (ω|H1) = WC(ω)
This approximation allows them to easily calculate the likelihood ratio (Bayes factor)
of each field value as:










With the assumption and using previous approximation, likelihood ratio of a video X












Using this formula an array assigning one ratio to each class Cj ∈ C can be computed,
getting a function X −→ (LC1(X), . . . , LCs(X)). The interpretation of the ratio may vary,
depending on the evaluation method. The authors suggest to consider H1 if LC(X) > 0.
This approach can result in multiple classified sources, as multiple classes can give a
positive likelihood ratios. They then opt for the highest LC(X).
As mentioned previously formula also lays in the assumption of the independence of
ωj ∈ X which is not guaranteed as they might be repeated field-values in the same path, or
having correlations between fields. This will produce biased ratios, by accounting multiple
times the same information.
In order to mitigate the effect of correlated values, authors suggest to insert a
decorrelation factor to formula 2.11 used to compute the likelihood ratio of video X =
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(ω1, ..., ωn) is modified applying an exponent αi to each LC(ωi) based on the repetitions
of ωi in the video.
The approach is however useless to deal with correlations between fields values, and
was not even tested on the experimental phase.
In this paper the authors state a first approach on automated video classification and
video integrity for MP4-like videos, with promising results. This approach lacks, however,
of a more refined way of comparing field-values to reflect the expected changes between
videos. They also assume that the measure used to compare videos, the dissimilarity, lacks




This chapter will describe what has been achieved related to the objective set up on
chapter 1.
3.1 Overview
The current work has been focused on MP4-like file formats, these are formats
compliant with ISO/IEC 14496 Part 12 [Int17], or based on Apple QuickTime [App16]
standard, so it covers not only MP4 but also MOV files. As shown in [GFK14], both
standards define the video file as a sequence of atoms. The atoms types are also specified
by the standard, and are composed by a header (identifying the type) and a data box
that may include field-value (leaves) or other atoms (like sub-trees), generating a kind of
hierarchical tree. However, this specification is open to different implementations, and so,
discrepancies on the structure appear depending on the creator of the file. Video and audio
encoding parameters also differ, making video container not so standard. This degree of
freedom was proven useful in [ISF+19] for integrity verification and source identification.
The scope of this work was to extend the work of [ISF+19] and define a clustering
algorithm to group video files by source without supervision. The aim should be to split
by the exact device, but as the container depends mainly on the software, and just a bit
on hardware specifications, this has not been possible. The granularity is then settled for
brand grouping. On the contrary, the clustering of videos from social networks will be
added to the scope.
Two solutions will be proposed, relying on similar basis, to tackle this problem. None of
both is perfect, but both can help at splitting videos for further analysis. This approach
is not intended to replace supervised algorithms for identification of the source, but to
complement the analysis of video files.
3.2 Technologies
Some tools had been used in this work for two main purposes: to extract data from
video files, and to manipulate the extracted data. The full code can be found in https:
//gitlab.fdi.ucm.es/esteban/atoms-project-tfg/tree/cgermes_tfg.
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3.2.1 Information Extraction and Storage
To extract the atoms information, a solution written in Python and developed by
the Group of Analysis, Security and Systems (GASS) of the department of Software
Engineering and Artificial Intelligence at Universidad Complutense de Madrid has been
used. This solution is able to parse multiple information from any MP4/H.264 video, MOV
video, and 3gp, to extract the atoms information. The values inside had been converted
to utf-8 when possible and if not it is kept as hexadecimal. The solution was modified to



















Figure 3.1: Partial example of a Samsung Galaxy S3 mini video
The Figure 3.1 is an example of how the information of the video container looks like.
Atoms are marked in blue and field-values with a ’@’. Only part is represented as the
specific video used has 11 atoms and 55 field-values. This example shows the ftyp atom,
which was one of the first analysed in [GFK14] as “the file type atom identifies the file
type specifications with which the file is compatible” [App16]. It contains, for example,
fields @majorBrand and @compatibleBrands, to identify the a more specific version of
the implementation of the file. As stated before, there are many under the umbrella of
the ISO standard.
From this information from the video, for each field-value, the solution gets the Path,
the PathOrder which adds the relative order from its siblings, the Field and the Value.
For the given example in Table 3.1, the output is shown in Table 3.1. For our purposes,
videos are defined as sets of PathOrderField, that is: the PathOrder and the Field pasted
together with a ”/” as separator. The result is also shown in the same table.
3.2. Technologies 17
Path PathOrder Field Value PathOrderField PathFieldValue
ftyp ftyp-1 majorBrand mp42 ftyp-1/majorBrand ftyp/majorBrand=mp42
ftyp ftyp-1 minorVersion 1 ftyp-1/minorVersion ftyp/minorVersion=1
ftyp ftyp-1 compatibleBrands mp41mp42isom ftyp-1/compatibleBrands ftyp/compatibleBrands=mp41mp42isom
beam beam-2 byteInitial 28 beam-2/byteInitial beam/byteInitial=28
beam beam-2 size 24 beam-2/size beam/size=24
moov/mvhd moov-4/mvhd-1 creationTime 2017-07-28 9:14:13 moov-4/mvhd-1/creationTime moov/mvhd/creationTime=28/07/2017 9:14:13
moov/trak/tkhd moov-4/trak-2/tkhd-1 version 0 moov-4/trak-2/tkhd-1/version moov/trak/tkhd/version=0
moov/trak/tkhd moov-4/trak-2/tkhd-1 flags 1 moov-4/trak-2/tkhd-1/flags moov/trak/tkhd/flags=1
moov/trak/tkhd moov-4/trak-2/tkhd-1 trackId 1 moov-4/trak-2/tkhd-1/trackId moov/trak/tkhd/trackId=1
moov/trak/tkhd moov-4/trak-2/tkhd-1 trackWidth 48 moov-4/trak-2/tkhd-1/trackWidth moov/trak/tkhd/trackWidth=48
moov/trak/tkhd moov-4/trak-2/tkhd-1 trackHeight 848 moov-4/trak-2/tkhd-1/trackHeight moov/trak/tkhd/trackHeight=848
Table 3.1: Table with Path, PathOrder, Field and Value of the elements shown in Figure
3.1, alongside with the corresponding PathOrderField and PathFieldValue
For the shake of efficiency and reproducibility, the extracted information has been
uploaded to a mongoDB in ”videoforensics-kzcri.gcp.mongodb.net/test” that can be read
using the username ”public” without password. Therefore, it is available to the public.
3.2.2 Preprocessing and Data Manipulation
This part had been developed in Python too, using Jupyter notebooks. The libraries
used include pymongo to download the data from the database, pandas to structure
it, imblearn for oversampling, and many sklearn and scipy modules. From sklearn
CountVectorizer to vectorize the lists of elements, DBSCAN and metrics. From scipy,
metrics, hierarchy clusters. Additionnaly, many minor libraries had been used, as classic
matplotlib and Collections.
3.2.3 DBSCAN
Density-Based Spatial Clustering of Applications with Noise, proposed by Martin
Ester, Hans-Peter Kriegel, Jo¨rg Sander y Xiaowei Xu in 1996 [EKSX96], is a well-known
clustering algorithm.
The algorithm tries to generate clusters based on distances between point. Each cluster
is composed by at least one core point, and its edge. One point is core point if it has at
least minPoints within distance  (including itself). Then, all edge points are those within
distance  from a core point. In other case, the point is considered noise.
(a) minPoints = 3 (b) minPoints = 2 (c) minPoints = 1
Figure 3.2: Examples of DBSCAN with variations of minPoints, with core points in red,
border points in green, and noise in black
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In this brief description appeared the two parameters of the algorithm:  and
minPoints. Both are related with the density of the clusters, however the last one is
more confusing. A high minPoints value indicates not only that no cluster can be smaller
than it, but also that density must be high to allow core point to have at least minPoints
close neighbours.
The example in Figure 3.2 shows the effect of the variations in the minPoints
parameter. With minPoints = 3 the first figure shows 2 core points (red), 2 on the
border (green) and 1 noise point (black). As the minPoints decreases the number of core
point increases until a new cluster arises with minPoints = 1. If minPoints > 3 then
every point will be noise.
3.2.4 Hierarchical Clustering (Agglomerative)
Hierarchical clustering is based on distances between point, creating a tree with the
points on the leafs, and the nodes been groups of videos. The joining of two nodes is based
on a metric, and a linkage method.
Linkages define how the distance between two nodes is computed, based on the metric
selected. When nodes are leafs (points), for every linkage, the distance between them
is simply the distance between the points. When a node is composed of multiple leafs,
thinks get more complex. The simpler linkages are the minimum distance between every
pair of points from each node, and the maximum one. More complex linkages take the
average. Linkage criterion selected for the proposed solution is the weighted average,
defined recursively as:
d((a ∪ b), c) = d(a, c) + d(b, c)2 (3.1)
The Table 3.2 sumarised the criteria. Criteria used in the proposed algorithm is the
weighted average.
Linkage Formula
Single min{d(a, b) : a ∈ A, b ∈ B}







Weighted Avg d((a ∪ b), c) = d(a,c)+d(b,c)2
Table 3.2: Common linkage criterion for hierarchical clustering
The result of the linkage can be summarise in a dendrogram, like the shown in Figure
3.3. Each node represents the linking of two nodes at a height h.
Then, when the linkage is done and the hierarchy tree is defined, it remains how to
extract the clusters. The method used is to cut a node when the height h is unusually
high. The inconsistency is, shown in , a measure of how unexpectedly high is the height of
the node. Other possibilities, like preserving only the top N clusters, require the number
of clusters to be known. A node is cut when its inconsistency is higher than a threshold
t. The inconsistency is calculated based on average and standard deviation of the heights
of its lower level nodes in a depth d.
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Where average and standard deviation are computed over all the height of the
descendants of the node up to a depth depth.
Figure 3.3: Example of dendrogram
3.3 Description of the Solution
The first solution will use Hierarchical Clustering and inconsistency criteria to cut
down the different clusters, ensuring that each cluster is composed exclusively by videos
of one single brand.
The second solution rely on DBSCAN to preform a clustering either homogeneous nor
complete but still accurate of the videos by source.
Extraction of the data
The solution described in 3.2.1 extracts from MP4-like videos the container
information split as specified, and uploads it to a mongoDB.
{
”FileName” : ” D17 V flat move 0001 . mp4” ,
” Source ” : ” Or i g i na l ” ,
” Device ” : ”D17” ,
”Brand” : ” Mic roso f t ” ,
”Model” : ”Lumia640LTE” ,
” Scenar io ” : ” f l a t ” ,
”Type” : ”move” ,
”atoms” :
[
{” F i e ld ” : ” order ” ,
”Path” : ”/ f typ /” ,
”PathAndOrder” : ”/ ftyp−1/” ,
” Value ” : ”1”
} ,
{” F i e ld ” : ”majorBrand” ,
”Path” : ”/ f typ /” ,
”PathAndOrder” : ”/ ftyp−1/” ,





Figure 3.4: Example of the representation of the data extracted from videos with the API
described in 3.2.1
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Gather the data
With the information gathered, query the database to download the requiered videos
to cluster alongside with the array of elements composing the video, PathOrderField
or PathFieldValue, and recover the data in a dataframe. A sample of the resulting
dataframe for PathOrderField is shown in Table 3.3.
FileName Element
D01 V outdoor panrot 0002.mp4 /moov-3/mvhd-1/currentTime
D01 V outdoor panrot 0002.mp4 /moov-4/trak-2/tkhd-1/version
D01 V outdoor panrot 0002.mp4 /moov-4/trak-2/tkhd-1/layer
D01 V flatWA still 0001.mp4 /moov-4/trak-3/mdia-3/minf-3/dinf-2/dref-1/url
D01 V indoorWA still 0002.mp4 /moov-4/mvhd-1/timeScale
Table 3.3: Random example of the gathered data
Vectorization
Using pandas group by video concatenating each element composing the videos
delimited by double quotes (”). This middle stage is shwon in Table 3.4. Thanks
to the group by the CountVectorizer (a text mining tool) can be used to generate
a matrix where each row is a video, each column an element, and 0/1 indicates
the video having this element (not the actual count of appearances). The result is
shown in Table 3.5. The benefits of vectorizing is the simplification of the further
manipulation of the data. For example, the dissimilarity formula introduced in
[ISF+19] is reduced to a simple vectors operation, as described in 4.2.2.
FileName Element
D01 V flatYT still 0001.mp4 “/ftyp-1/majorBrand”, “/ftyp-1/minorVersion”, ...
D01 V indoorYT panrot 0002.mp4 “/ftyp-1/majorBrand”, “/ftyp-1/minorVersion”, ...
D01 V indoorWA panrot 0001.mp4 “/ftyp-1/majorBrand”, “/ftyp-1/minorVersion”, ...
D01 V flatWA still 0001.mp4 “/ftyp-1/majorBrand”, “/ftyp-1/minorVersion”, ...
D01 V indoor move 0002.mp4 “/ftyp-1/majorBrand”, “/ftyp-1/minorVersion”, ...
Table 3.4: Random example of the data grouped by video file
FileName /beam-2/notEspecified /ftyp-1/compatibleBrands /ftyp-1/majorBrand /ftyp-1/minorVersion /moov-3/mvhd-1/creationTime
D01 V flat move 0001.mp4 0 1 1 1 1
D01 V outdoorWA panrot 0001.mp4 1 1 1 1 0
D01 V flatYT move 0002.mp4 0 1 1 1 0
D01 V outdoorWA panrot 0002.mp4 1 1 1 1 0
D01 V indoorYT panrot 0001.mp4 0 1 1 1 0
Table 3.5: Part of the dataframe after vectorization
Filtering
Using pandas, filter the columns corresponding to the unwanted atoms and fields.
The removed elements are those specified in 4.2.3: the ones containing mdta and
udta in the path (with or without order) and the ones with field uuid, payload,
notEspecified, xyz, entries, size, modificationT ime, stuff , creationT ime,
duration, entryCount, sampleCount, unkn or freeSpace. This filtering is an
extension of the one performed in [ISF+19].
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Even if the columns names are strings, thanks to the uniform format and regexp
their are easy to spot. The output is exactly alike the one in Table 3.5 but without
the concerned columns.
Clustering data
Recover the binary matrix of values from the dataframe representing your dataset.
Each line represents an observation, video file, and columns dimensions. To
cluster the data, two algorithms are proposed: For PathFieldValue, use Hierarchical
Clustering and dice metric and cut the node when the inconsistency value, calculated
for a depth of 2, exceeds 1,14879084. For PathOrderField, use DBSCAN and
Sokal-Sneath metric with minPoints = 5 and  = 0, 0375229685.
DBSCAN Hierarchical Clustering
PathOrderField PathFieldValue
metric = sokalsneath metric = dice
 = 0, 0375229685 linkage=weighted
minPoints= 5 criterion = ’inconsistent’
threshold = 1,14879084
depth = 2





The dataset used will be VISION [vis17]. This dataset has been chosen because it was
the one used in [ISF+19]. Its main advantage is that it is constituted by smartphone videos
and images. It was thought to explore relations between images and videos taken by the
same camera, a very interesting problem nowadays with the omnipresence of smartphones.
Even if images will be ignored in this work, it is still a good dataset of smartphone videos,
and it also includes their transformation to social network.
It is composed by 35 devices, 29 models, and 11 brands. A total of 1914 videos.
Of those, only 648 are original, and the rest has been uploaded to a social network and
downloaded again. The result are 644 WhatsApp videos, and 622 from Youtube. The
result can be seen in Table 4.1. In terms of container analysis, the former videos must be
considered as two big classes, WA (WhatsApp) and YT (YouTube). These videos have
been reencoded in other containers when uploaded, making the original source untrackable.
Also, videos from WhatsApp had been uploaded using an iPhone 7, even if it was not the
source. Nevertheless, they still offer a trace of the social network that encoded it.
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Brand Model Device # Videos
Apple iPad2 D12 16
Ipad mini D20 16
iPhone 4 D09 19




iPhone 5C D05 19
D14 19
D18 13
iPhone 6 D06 17
D15 18
iPhone 6 Plus F19 19
Asus Zenphone 2 Laser D23 19
Huawei Ascend G6-U10 D33 19
Honor 5C NEM-L51 D30 19
P8 GRA-L09 D28 19
P9 EVA-L09 D03 19
P9 Lite VNS-L31 D16 19
Lenovo Lenovo P70-A D07 19
LG D290 D04 19
Microsoft Lumia 640 LTE D17 10
OnePlus A3000 D25 19
A3003 D32 19
Samsung Galaxy S III Mini GT-I8190 D26 16
Galaxy S III Mini GT-I8190N D01 22
Galaxy S3 GT-I9300 D11 19
Galaxy S4 mini GT-I9195 D31 19
Galaxy S5 SM-G900F D27 19
Galaxy Tab 3 GT-P5210 D08 37
Galaxy Tab A SM-T555 D35 16
Galaxy Trend Plus GT-S7580 D22 16
Sony Xperia Z1 Compact D5503 D12 19
Wiko Ridge 4G D21 11
Xiaomi Redmi Note 3 D24 19
WhatsApp WhatsApp WhatsApp 644
Youtube Youtube Youtube 622
Table 4.1: Composition of the VISION dataset
4.2 Semimetric Space
The right representation of the data is key part for any data related problem. So,
multiple metric (or semimetric) spaces had been considered. A metric or semimetric space
is just a set of elements (called points, or videos in our case) and a metric or semimetric
that computes a distance between them..
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4.2.1 Elements Representation
The proposed representation in [ISF+19] is to work with the combination of
PathOrderFieldValue. Nevertheless, once all the formulas have been defined to work with
videos as set of elements, the universe of elements composing the videos can be modified.
Different representations of the same dataset had been defined. Starting with the reminder
of the definition of PathOrderField and PathFieldValue , and then other possible universes
will be shown.
PathOrderField
The structure the atoms, and the contained fields, already offer valuable information.
Removing part of the information (the value) weakens the condition for equality, and
might allow to ignore smaller diferences. The PathOrderField is defined as the union
of the ordered path and the field separated with a ’/’. Remember, for example, the
first row of Table 3.1 is ftyp− 1/majorBrand.
PathFieldValue
The order of the atoms could not be so relevant, as one missing atom on the root
could make two (almost) equals videos completely different. The PathFieldValue is
defined as the union of Path and Field separated by a ’/’ and then the Value separated
by a ”=” is added. The first row of Table 3.1 is then ftyp/majorBrand = mp42.
PathOrderFieldValues
The most complete element we can get with the information gathered from the
file. The PathOrderFieldValue is defined as the union of the PathOrder and Field
separated by a ’/’ and then the Value separated by a ”=” is added. The first row of
Table 3.1 is then ftyp− 1/majorBrand = mp42.
PathField
From the two previous reasoning, we get the weakest of all the possible elements
elements. The PathField is defined as the union of Path and Field separated by a
’/’. The first row of Table 3.1 is then ftyp/majorBrand.
4.2.2 Metric
One measure is needed for clustering, verifying the conditions below. However, some
of the proposed ”measures” doees not hold the triangular inequality. These functions are
called semimetrics. Clustering in a semimetric space is still possible, at least for the the
two chosen methods, so this will not cause probles. Still, semimetrics will be marked.
D(x, y) ≥ 0
D(x, y) = 0⇔ x = y
D(x, y) = D(y, x)
D(x, z) ≤ D(x, y) +D(y, z)
One extra notation is used additionally to the regular set notation. This notation is
very useful when representing set as a binary array where each position corresponds to an
element and the 0 or 1 indicates the absence or presence of the element in the set. Then
the notation is just product of vectors. This gives place to the following notation:
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Given two videos X and Y of a universe Ω with Z = ⋃
X∈Ω
X:
n11 =|S|, where S = {x | x ∈ X,x ∈ Y }
n00 =|S|, where S = {x | x /∈ X,x /∈ Y, x ∈ Z}
n10 =|S|, where S = {x | x ∈ X,x /∈ Y }
n01 =|S|, where S = {x | x /∈ X,x ∈ Y }
(4.1)
Dissimilarity semimetric
The dissimilarity function defined in [ISF+19] establish a way to compute
“distances” between videos. It has been redefined to work with videos as sets, more
simple and understandable. As shown in Figure 4.1 it does not hold triangular
inequality, even if it holds the rest, so it is a semimetric.
D : X × Y → [0, 1]
X × Y → 1− |X ∩ Y |(|X|+ |Y |)2|X||Y |
= 1− n11(2n11 + n10 + n01)2((n11 + n10)(n11 + n01)
(4.2)
Figure 4.1: Example of schema violating the Triangular Inequality for the Dissimilarity
semimetric
Jaccard Distamce
The Jaccard Distance (JD) is associated to the Jaccard Index (JI). It is a well known
metric, and it is defined as:
JD : X × Y → [0, 1]
X × Y → 1− JI(X,Y ) = 1− |X ∩ Y ||X ∪ Y |
= 1− n11
n11 + n10 + n01
(4.3)
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Hamming Distance
The Hamming Distance is metric defined as the number of differences between two
vectors, and defines a metric. For sets (seen as binary vectors) is the number of
elements in X not in Y plus the opposite:
HD : X × Y → N
X × Y → |X|+ |Y | − 2|X ∩ Y |
= n10 + n01
(4.4)
Cosine Distance
The cosine distance (CD) is a semimetric, but not thought for sets. Nevertheless
if sets are represented as as binary vectors it is equivalent to the Otsuka-Ochiai
coefficient, equivalent to the cosine similarity (CS), and then it gets:
CD : X × Y → [0, 1]
X × Y → 1− CS(X,Y ) = 1− |X ∩ Y |√|X| × |Y |
= 1− n11√
(n11 + n10)× (n11 + n01)
(4.5)
Sørensen–Dice Dissimilarity
The Sørensen–Dice dissimilarity (SD) is a semimetric that comes from the
Sørensen–Dice coefficient (SDC), and it is defined as:
SD : X × Y → [0, 1]
X × Y → 1− SDC(X,Y ) = 1− 2|X ∩ Y ||X|+ |Y |
= 1− 2n112n11 + n10 + n01
(4.6)
Sokal-Sneath metric
The Sokal-Sneath (SS) metric is defined as:
SS : X × Y → [0, 1]
X × Y → 2(|X ∪ Y | − |X ∩ Y |)2|X ∪ Y | − |X ∩ Y |
= 2(n11 + n10 + n01)3n11 + 2n10 + n01
(4.7)
Euclidean metric
The classic euclidean metric (L2) applied to sets viewed as binary vectors:
L2: X × Y → R+
X × Y →
√
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Yule Dissimilarity
The Yule Dissimilarity (YD) is a semimetric that cannot be explained only in terms
of X and Y alone, it also depends on the number of unique elements contained in the
union of all the videos of the universe, N = | ⋃
Z∈Ω
Z|. So this metric is dependent on
the the universe of videos, taking in account not only what they do have in common,
but what they both miss.
Y D : X × Y → R+
X × Y → 2(|X| − |X ∩ Y |)(|Y | − |X ∩ Y |)|X ∩ Y |(N − |X| − |Y |) + |X||Y |
= 2n10n01(n10n01)(n11n00)
(4.9)
Other alternatives have been thought, as almost any metric, semimetric, o function
can be applied, as minkowski distances, canberra, etc. Many were tested too:
Manhattan, Canberra, Chebyshev, Correlation, Kulsinski, Rogers-Tanimoto, Russell-Rao,
and Sokal-Michener but they revealed no interest.
Of those some are equivalent when applied to sets, as Canberra and Manhattan
(equivalent to Hamming), or Chebyshev, that will be equivalent to discrete metric. Even
any ρ-minkowski metric, will only be equivalent to the euclidean one.
4.2.3 Filtering
Apart from the variations of the initial elements, it is worth to consider filtering some
by various reasons. Some atoms might be kept apart because they are vulnerable to
modifications. The removed atoms are: mdta, udta.
Also, if the Value is part of the element, it could not be representative to consider
fields related to modification time, size of the file, etc. Those fields are different in every
video because they represent unique characteristics that will never be repeated. It is just
noise. However, even if the the Value not is part of the element, it could be interesting to
remove some of these fields, as it has been seen.
The removed fields are: uuid, payload, notEspecified, xyz, entries, size,
modificationT ime, stuff , creationT ime, duration, entryCount, sampleCount, unkn,
freeSpace.
4.2.4 Oversampling
As stated before, the data set is composed by 35 devices, 29 models and 11 brands.
Plus the two huge classes of 638 videos from YT and WA. Even ignoring those two, the
number of samples per class (at any level) is not balanced as shown in Table 4.1.
This can cause some classes to bias the result, by having a greater impact on the result
just because their size.
To deal with, data set is oversampled. For oversampling, elements from minority
classes will be duplicated until the class matches the size of the biggest one. Nevertheless,
this is not always possible due to memory limitations. The resulting size of the data set is
too big. For example, considering videos by model, oversamplig produces 19964 samples
(ten times more than initially).
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4.3 Selection of the Representation of the Data
In this section the experimental method to select the appropriate (semi)metric space
is explained. It has also been take advantage of to choose label work with, and to filter or
not.
4.3.1 Evaluation for Elements and Metric Selection
In order to choose the best representation of the dataset to cluster, and the best
metric, the alternatives had be tested with the silhouette coefficient. The representation
and measure with the highest silhouette coefficient will be the most likely to be correctly
separated.
The silhouette coefficient is a measure of the consistency of the clusters. It measures
both the cohesion and separation of the clusters. It is computed for every point and then
the average is taken.
For every point in the data set i ∈ Ck.












1− a(i)/b(i) a(i) < b(i)
0 a(i) = b(i)
a(i)/b(i)− 1 a(i) > b(i)
(4.12)
4.3.2 Configuration of the Experiment
All the posible metric and semimetric spaces had been putted to the test, as shown in
left side of Table 4.2. Additionally, each metric space will be tested for each possible label,
to see the viability of grouping videos at different levels, and with and without filtering,
as shown in the right side. This gives a total of 192 executions.
For each execution, silhouette coefficient of all the videos in the dataset and just the
original ones were computed, to see which is the most suitable representation, level of
grouping and preprocessing to work with.
On the experiment performed only with original videos those were oversampled to
extend the minority classes to match the size of the biggest one.
Elements Metric Label Filtering
PathField Dissimilarity Brand Yes







Table 4.2: Table with the possible elements and metrics. Added to them, the possible
labels of each observation of the generated semimetric space, and the possible filtering
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4.3.3 Results
The table with the whole results can be found in Table A.1. The maximum (for
any metric) silhouette coefficient found for each combination can be found in Table 4.3,
alongside with the filter. It can be seen that the values with the full dataset and only with
original videos do not always go along.
Therefore, in Table 4.4 the maximum (for any metric) silhouette coefficient of the
average between the full dataset and only the original videos are represented. One
configuration over stands, the PathOrderField at brand level with filtering, and other
3 that are close, as shown in Table 4.5. PathOrderFieldValue, even if used at [ISF+19]
has an ordinary silhouette coefficient, so it will be left apart.
Nonetheless, it is important to see consistent results for the different metrics and
filtering. Important variations are expected, but outliers might point unexpected
behaviours. In Table 4.6 the top 3 metric for each of the most promising configurations
shown in 4.5. It can be seen that the silhouette coefficient is slightly affected by the chosen
metric, with the exception of Yule. Remember that Yule semimetric has the particularity
of using the n00 from equation 4.1.
Filter
No Yes
Dataset Class Full dataset Original only Full dataset Original only
PathField Brand 0,726358 0,045549 0,250225 0,398712
PathField Device 0,668669 0,22359 -0,044316 0,280359
PathField Model 0,622528 0,646994 -0,104571 0,086335
PathFieldValue Brand 0,653203 0,559167 0,661963 0,686108
PathFieldValue Device 0,655339 0,449343 0,696647 0,417425
PathFieldValue Model 0,615433 0,555977 0,647963 0,589758
PathOrderField Brand 0,765278 0,239737 0,747372 0,67382
PathOrderField Device 0,686581 0,239942 0,666356 0,259924
PathOrderField Model 0,630161 0,665327 0,609536 0,226282
PathOrderFieldValue Brand 0,536545 0,414133 0,588605 0,625443
PathOrderFieldValue Device 0,473966 0,385987 0,539669 0,300273
PathOrderFieldValue Model 0,432278 0,495649 0,488659 0,517986
Table 4.3: Table of the maximum silhouette coefficient per combination for any metric
with the top 3 values for the full dataset and only with original videos highlighted
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Filter
Dataset Class No Yes
PathField Brand 0,3859535 0,220807
PathField Device 0,445123 0,1180215
PathField Model 0,634761 -0,009118
PathFieldValue Brand 0,606185 0,6740355
PathFieldValue Device 0,552341 0,557036
PathFieldValue Model 0,585705 0,6188605
PathOrderField Brand 0,4989525 0,710596
PathOrderField Device 0,4632615 0,46314
PathOrderField Model 0,647744 0,417909
PathOrderFieldValue Brand 0,453314 0,60656
PathOrderFieldValue Device 0,383566 0,395454
PathOrderFieldValue Model 0,462516 0,4527485
Table 4.4: Table of the maximum average silhouette coefficient per combination for any
metric. Top 4 values are highlighted
Elements Label Filter Silhouette
PathOrderField Brand Yes 0,711
PathFieldValue Brand Yes 0,674
PathOrderField Model No 0,648
PathField Model No 0,635
Table 4.5: Most promising configurations based on the maximum average between both
executions. The three most promising results for the full dataset and only for original
videos are highlighted in green and yellow
Elements Label Filter Metric Full Original Avg
PathOrderField Brand Yes euclidean 0,747 0,673 0,710
PathOrderField Brand Yes sokalsneath 0,732 0,661 0,697
PathOrderField Brand Yes jaccard 0,730 0,647 0,689
PathOrderField Model No euclidean 0,630 0,665 0,647
PathOrderField Model No sokalsneath 0,618 0,655 0,636
PathOrderField Model No jaccard 0,611 0,641 0,626
PathFieldValue Brand Yes yule 0,661 0,686 0,674
PathFieldValue Brand Yes dice 0,490 0,559 0,525
PathFieldValue Brand Yes cosine 0,490 0,558 0,524
PathField Model No euclidean 0,622 0,646 0,634
PathField Model No sokalsneath 0,609 0,642 0,625
PathField Model No dissimilarity 0,605 0,642 0,624
Table 4.6: Top 3 metrics of the most promising configurations based on the maximum
average between both executions
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4.3.4 Conclusion
The most promising configurations had been exposed on Table 4.6 and for the next
experiments limit to them. In Figure 4.2 the result of the silhouette analysis for
PathOrderField and Sokal-Sneath metric are shown for original videos is shown as an
example. It can be seen that except for Huawei and Xiaomi, the classes have positive
silhouette coefficients, even perfect ones.
Figure 4.2: Silhouette coefficient for all brands in the dataset as PathOrderField with
metric Sokal-Sneath and filtering
4.4 Evaluation for Clustering Performance
The question of how to measure the performance of the clustering is important in order
to compare the multiple algorithms and configurations. To do so, a function to compare
the predicted clusters with the real classes of the videos is needed. Only informed measures
had been used, depending on the real labels of the elements, because uninformed techniques
were empirically useless because of the dispersion of the data.
The desired properties of the measure include [VEB10]:
Normalisation
As different metrics and representations of the dataset are used, this is a mandatory
property to be valid for comparison.
Constant baseline
A measure that is biased by “luck” will not be useful. Many of the common measures
tend to higher values when the size of the clusters decreases (N/K is low).
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Other properties as the measure to define a metric, can be a nice to have, but will not
impact on our results.
Clusters are no more than partitions over the universe X of videos (with |X| = N). That
is: U = {Ui}i∈K such as: ⋃
U∈U
U = X and ∀A,B ∈ U, A 6= B =⇒ A ∩B = ∅.
Over all the possible approaches, two over stand:
Pair counting




, they can belong to the same cluster in
both partitions U and V (N11), be in different clusters in both partitions (N00) or
be in the same cluster in one partition and not in the other (N01 or N10).
Information Theory
Using the entropy, conditional entropy and joint entropy, mutual information offers
the measure of shared information between the partitions.
The Adjusted Mutual Information (AMI) has been selected because it works better for
unbalanced cluster size [RVBV16]. The V-Measure has been monitored too as it offers an
insight on what is going on.
4.4.1 Mutual Information (MI)
The mutual information is a measure of the shared information between two partitions.
It relies on information theory and entropy calculus to do so.
The comparison of two partitions can be summarised in a contingency table as shown
in the example in Figure 4.3. The partitions are U and V over X with |U| = R, |V| = C.
Then:
∀i ∈ [[1, R]], |Ui| = ai (4.13)
∀j ∈ [[1, C]], |Vj | = bj (4.14)
∀i, j ∈ [[1, R]]× [[1, C]], |Ui ∩ Vj | = nij (4.15)
(a) Simple example (b) Notation
Figure 4.3: Contingency table
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H(U) is non-negative and takes the value 0 only when there is no uncertainty
determining an object’s cluster membership, that, when there is only one cluster. Similarly,





where PV(j) = bjN .










where PU∩V(i, j) = |Ui∩Vj |N =
nij
N
MI is a non-negative quantity, quantifying the shared information between the two
partitions. Nevertheless, it does not hold the normalisation property, but its upper
bounded by H(U) and H(V).




Then, the result lies in the range [0, 1]. Besides the improvement, it still fails the
“constant baseline” property. As the ratio N/K decreases, the Rand Index tends to increase
even for random clusters.
4.4.2 Adjusted Mutual Information (AMI)
As stated before, the Mutual Information tends to lie on higher values under certain
constraints. To deal with, the Adjusted Mutual Information arises. It takes into account
the expected value E{MI(U, V )} for a random partition to correct the MI.















ai!bj !(N − ai)!(N − bj)!
N !nij !(ai − nij)!(bj − nij)!(N − ai − bj + nij)!
(4.21)
where (ai + bj −N)+
The resulting Adjusted Mutual Information does hold both the normalisation and the
constant baseline.
Adjusted MI︷ ︸︸ ︷
AMI(U, V ) =
MI︷ ︸︸ ︷
MI(U, V )−
Expected MI︷ ︸︸ ︷
E{MI(U, V )}
max {H(U), H(V )}︸ ︷︷ ︸
MI upeerbound





This is the harmonic mean of the homogeneity and completeness of the predicted
clusters with respect to the true labels. It can be seen as a kind of F-Score for clustering
evaluation. It is based on the MI and the entropy of each partition. Lets say U are the





VM = 2(homogeneity × completne
oss)
(homogeneity + completeness (4.25)
The V-measure does hold the normalisation property, but not the constant baseline,
as the MI. This measure is, even so, interesting as an insight on the results.
4.5 DBSCAN
DBSCAN algorithm presented in [EKSX96], and introduced in chapter 3, had been
used to try to cluster video files.
4.5.1 Configuration of the Experiment
The 12 configurations shown in Table 4.6 had been used to run DBSCAN. The
remaining parameters are epsilon value, , and minPoints. The latter will be fixed to
5, as DBSCAN main difference with Hierarchical Clustering is its ability to ignore noise.
Epsilon, however, has been varied.
The range of variation of  depends on the metric: for metrics taking values in range
[0, 1], values from 10−5 to 1 had been tested, for euclidean values had gone from 0.1 to√
| ⋃
X∈Ω
X|/10, one tenth of the maximum possible value. Notice that the minimum value
of epsilon for euclidean is equivalent to 0, as the minimum distance between two non equal
binary vectors is ≥ 1. Zero was not directly been tested because it was technically not
allowed. Along this range 250 values were tested, distributed in a logarithmic scale.
Two different executions had been performed, using different subsets for train and test.
Even if clustering is not supposed to have a training, the need to look for the adequate
value for , and the use of informed measures (as AMI) forces us to do so. The multiple
sets combination are shown in Table 4.7.
4.5.2 Results
The complete results can be found in appendix B.
Train Test Results
66% Full 33% Full Table B.1
66% Original (oversampled) 33% Original (oversampled) Table B.2
Table 4.7: Different combinations of train and test subsets and location of table with
results
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It is interesting to notice that the maximum AMI values for each configuration is pretty
independent of the metric. The only exception is the case of the Yule dissimilarity. Yule
has the particularity of looking at the the elements absent on both videos, so it is expected
to have different behaviours. Its results, however, are quite deceiving.
At Model level configurations, it is also interesting that the max AMI value is achieved
at very low epsilon values. It is in fact equivalent to  = 0, and it will have the same
behaviour with any metric. The resulting clusters made can be seen in Figure 4.4.
Figure 4.4: Result of the clustering with DBSCAN of the 33% of the original part of the
dataset as PathOrderField with euclidean metric and  = 0 equivalent to discrete metric
At Brand level, the best performance is different for the original dataset and for the
full dataset. This is because the original is oversampled, and the full not, so there is a bias
with Apple, Youtube and WhatsApp as majority classes. For the full dataset, the highest
value is with PathFieldValue, dice metric, and  = 0, 1038. However in Figure 4.7 it can
be seen that the clusters are just right for the majority classes.
Nevertheless, the top AMI value for the original dataset is with PathOrderField,
Sokal-Sneath metric and  = 0, 0375, producing the clusters shown in Figure 4.5. Figure
4.6 shows the result of this clustering for the test subset of the full dataset. It can be seen
that it correctly correctly groups Whatsapp and Youtube videos, even if they where not
in the training set that produced it. The AMI of this configuration evaluated with the
33% of the full dataset is 0,80, not so far from the 0,81 achieved by the previous one.
Regarding the V-Measure, we can see that this configuration has an homogeneity of
0,893 and a completeness of 0,688, indicating that the we can ”trust” that two grouped
together videos belong to the same brand, but not so much the opposite.
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Figure 4.5: Result of the clustering with DBSCAN the 33% used for testing of the original
part of the dataset as PathOrderField with Sokal-Sneath metric and  = 0, 0375
Figure 4.6: Result of the clustering with DBSCAN the 33% used for testing of the full
dataset as PathOrderField with Sokal-Sneath metric and  = 0, 0375
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Figure 4.7: Result of the clustering with DBSCAN the 33% used for testing of the full
part of the dataset as PathFieldValue with dice metric and  = 0, 1038
4.5.3 Conclusion
The results obtained at Model level (Figure 4.4) show the best we can achieve at
this level with PathOrderField or PathField, as the videos grouped together are identical.
Grouping those videos by model seems then impossible as they lack inter-class variability.
Further details will be seen in next section.
At Brand level, however, results were more encouraging. The configuration shown in
4.8 achieved to separate correctly Whatsapp, Youtube, LG, Lenovo and Sony videos, even
if lacking completeness. Some brands were more or less well separated, as Huawei and
Samsung, and others where directly classified as noise, namely Wiko and Microsoft. The







Table 4.8: Configuration of the DBSCAN experiment that performed the best
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33% Original 33% Full





Table 4.9: Results of the execution of the proposed clustering algorithm shown in Table
4.8
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4.6 Hierarchical Clustering
Hierarchical Clustering introduced in chapter 3, had been used to try to group video
files. This method allows also to draw the hierarchy of linkages between video files, so it
offers more valuable information.
4.6.1 Configuration of the Experiment
The 12 configurations shown in Table 4.6 had been used to run Hierarchical Clustering.
The remaining parameters are the linkage criterion, the depth d to compute the
inconsistency and the threshold t to cut. Multiple linkage criteria will be tested, and
the threshold t will vary too. The depth, however, will be fixed to d = 2. Higher values
are discouraged since they can be affected by the number of observations.
The threshold t will vary from 10−1 to 101, and the linkages methods are those
described in 3.2. This threshold measures, as explained in chapter 3, how the h ”jumps” of
the dendrogram vary, what are intuitively seen as unusual ”big” jumps. Along this range
250 t values were tested, distributed in a logarithmic scale.
Two different executions had been performed, using different subsets for train and test.
Even if clustering is not supposed to have a training, the need to look for the adequate value
for  using informed metrics (as AMI) forces us to do so. The multiple sets combination
are shown in Table 4.10.
4.6.2 Results
The full results are in appendix C, as summarised in Table 4.10.
Train Test Results
66% Full 33% Full Table 1
66% Original (oversampled) 33% Original (oversampled) Table 2
Table 4.10: Different combinations of train and test subsets and location of table with
results
As for DBSCAN at Model level, the max AMI value is at the lowest threshold possible.
It is still equivalent to cut the dendrogram at 0, so the metric and linkage are irrelevant.
In fact, the only difference is that DBSCAN with consider the clusters smaller that 5
elements as noise, because of the minPoints parameter.
For PathOrderField with filter, using Sokal-Sneath and a very low threshold (0,1) and
single linkage results are shown in Figure 4.8. Thanks to the linkage performed as part
of the hierarchical clustering, the dendrogram shown in Figure 4.9 allows to see some
details. The clusters on the left (clusters 1 to 7), correspond to videos from Apple models,
are pretty different of other brands, as they merge together at height 0,6, but with other
brands only at almost heigth 1. The OnePlus brand is also distinguishable, as the Sony
Xperia or the Wiko Ridge4G. Other devices from different brands, on the contrary, show
no difference with this representation, as the Asus Zenfone, producing videos exactly like
the ones from Huawei’s Honor 5c and P8. It is always impossible to distinguish an Asus
video from a Huawei one with this representation of the data.
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Figure 4.8: Result of the clustering with Hierarchical Clustering of the 33% used for testing
of the original part of the dataset as PathOrderField unfiltered with Sokal-Sneath metric
and threshold = 0.1 and linkage single equivalent to discrete metric
Figure 4.9: Dendrogram linking the resulting clusters from the clustering with Hierarchical
Clustering of the 33% used for testing of the original part of the dataset as PathOrderField
unfiltered with Sokal-Sneath metric and threshold = 0.1 and linkage single equivalent to
discrete metric
At Brand level, the highest AMI for both the full dataset and the original only came,
again with the threshold at the lowest level, threshold = 0, 1 for each of the suggested
metrics. The results look alike the one in Figure 4.8, but not exactly the same, as the
filter was applied to the data. Results are shown in Figure 4.10 for original videos only
and for the full dataset in Figure 4.12. The cluster produced are not to complete, but very
homogeneous, as only Asus, Huawei and Xiaomi are messed together (and one Samsung
video grouped with many Huawei’s).
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Figure 4.10: Result of the clustering with Hierarchical Clustering of the 33% used for
testing of the original part of the dataset as PathOrderField filtered with Sokal-Sneath
metric and threshold = 0.1 and linkage single equivalent to discrete metric
Figure 4.11: Dendrogram linking the resulting clusters from the clustering with
Hierarchical Clustering of the 33% used for testing of the original part of the dataset
as PathOrderField filtered with Sokal-Sneath metric and threshold = 0.1 and linkage
single equivalent to discrete metric
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Figure 4.12: Result of the clustering with Hierarchical Clustering of the 33% used for
testing with the full dataset as PathOrderField filtered with Sokal-Sneath metric and
threshold = 0.1 and linkage single equivalent to discrete metric
Figure 4.13: Result of the clustering with Hierarchical Clustering of the 33% of the full
dataset as PathFieldValue filtered with Dice metric and threshold = 0.1 and linkage
weighted
An interesting result is, nevertheless, offered by the PathFieldValue representation
of the dataset. Using weighted linkage and dice metric, with threshold = 1, 1490 for
inconsistency, the resulting grouping is completely homogeneous. There are 40 clusters
for the original dataset, with only 11 brands and 214 videos, but it is still an interesting
result as shown in 4.13. When evaluated with videos from Youtube and Whatsapp it is
still homogeneous, but the number of classes increases to 149, with only 632 observations,
around 4 videos per cluster.
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4.6.3 Conclusions
Thanks to the usage of the inconsistency as a way to cut the dendrogram it was
achieved to get an homogeneous clustering method, that can ensure that two videos were
recorded with a device of the same brand if grouped together. This configuration, shown
in Table 4.11, however, is not as good as it seems because of the poor completeness of the
result. The measure of the performance of this method can be found in Table 4.12. It is
still a good indicator of how the amount of information in PathFieldValue (with filter) is









Table 4.11: Configuration of the experiment that showed a perfect homogeneity
33% Original 33% Full





Table 4.12: Results of the execution of the proposed clustering algorithm shown in Table
4.11
Chapter 5
Conclusions and Future Work
This chapter summarise the findings and achievements of this piece, and establish lines
of actions for further works.
5.1 Conclusions
Along this document it has been shown how video file information can be exploited
to group videos by data source, without previous training of a classifier. The most
important part was proven to be the correct processing of the data before clustering.
As shown, the correct prepossessing of the data grant the adequate separation needed for
the clustering. This same criteria is also applicable to any future technique that attempts
to draw conclusions using video container information.
The usage of simple algorithms was also proven effective separating video files by
brand. The results were positive, and an algorithm was proven to be able to correctly
group videos in homogeneous clusters per brand, even if too many clusters appeared.
Another algorithm was also presenting offering a way better classification in general terms
even if not having the interesting property of homogeneity.
5.2 Future Work
On the same direction established by this work, some development lines arise.
• Combine elements
The representations of the videos seen can potentially be combined. Looking for
alternative representations of videos that combine strengths can be useful. For
example, combine PathOrderField and PathOrderFieldValue using the former for
fields that are expected to have different values. Or even developing metrics that
combine multiple representations.
• Increase the dataset
The current dataset is very limited. The strength of the unsupervised clustering is
in the ability to deal with unseen elements. Augmenting the size of the dataset, both
on number of videos per device and devices itself can be useful.
• Cross-validation for unseen devices
If the dataset is enlarged, cross validation can be used to increase reliability by
completely removing one of the classes at each time. It is important to completely
remove the device, to simulate the device too be completely new.
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• Classification or Integrity Validation
The defined representations of videos can be adopted to other problems. For
example, classification, or integrity validation. There is no reason why the




A medida que aumenta el numero de dispositivos mo´viles, y la mayor´ıa de ellos
equipados con una ca´mara, se vuelve ma´s fa´cil generar contenido de video, y se ha
demostrado que es una forma muy efectiva de comunicarse [Bec15]. Las previsiones lo
presentan como una tendencia creciente [Cis18]. Ya representa el 75% del tra´fico web, y
se cree que este nu´mero aumentara´ a 82% para 2021. Segu´n el ranking de Alexa [Ale],
YouTube es el segundo sitio web por tra´fico en diciembre de 2018, agregando ma´s de
300 horas de video por minuto [Asl18]. Adema´s, en el top 20 de sitios web por tra´fico
podemos encontrar siete redes sociales que incluyen videos (Facebook, Qq, Twitter, Reddit,
Vk, Weibo e Instagram). Adema´s, la videovigilancia es ahora una tendencia, no solo en
el hogar o las oficinas, sino tambie´n para fortalecer la seguridad pu´blica. Este es el caso
de Londres, con ma´s de 500 000 ca´maras instaladas, o el futuro de Chine con el programa
“Xue Liang” (”Sharp Eyes”).
La importancia del ana´lisis forense de videos esta´ ligada a este feno´meno, ya que
tambie´n aumenta el nu´mero de evidencias de video en asuntos legales. Sin embargo,
debido a las mejoras en las tecnolog´ıas informa´ticas y la red, se pueden manipular y
compartir datos de video tan fa´cilmente que “los videos digitales y las fotograf´ıas ya no
pueden considerarse una prueba de evidencia, ya que no se puede confiar en su origen e
integridad” [MFB+12]. Se necesitan herramientas para autenticar el contenido de video,
trazar el ciclo de vida, identificar la fuente, etc.
Los contenedores de video poseen informacio´n relevante sobre la fuente del archivo. Es
importante no confundir la informacio´n del contenedor de video con los metadatos, ya que
el primero utiliza informacio´n espec´ıfica a prueba de manipulaciones de la estructura del
archivo de video. La mayor parte del trabajo anterior se centra en el ana´lisis del contenido
del video en lugar del contenedor, incluso si este ana´lisis es mucho ma´s pesado.
6.2 Contexto
El presente Trabajo Fin de Grado se enmarca dentro de un proyecto de investigacio´n
titulado RAMSES aprobado por la Comisio´n Europea dentro del Programa Marco de
Investigacio´n e Innovacio´n Horizonte 2020 (Convocatoria H2020-FCT-2015, Accio´n de
Innovacio´n, Nu´mero de Propuesta: 700326) y en el que participa el Grupo GASS del
Departamento de Ingenier´ıa del Software e Inteligencia Artificial de la Facultad de
Informa´tica de la Universidad Complutense de Madrid (Grupo de Ana´lisis, Seguridad
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y Sistemas, http://gass.ucm.es, grupo 910623 del cata´logo de grupos de investigacio´n
reconocidos por la UCM).
Adema´s de la Universidad Complutense de Madrid participan las siguientes entidades:
• Treelogic Telema´tica y Lo´gica Racional para la Empresa Europea SL (Espan˜a)
• Ministe´rio da Justic¸a (Portugal)
• University of Kent (Reino Unido)
• Centro Ricerche e Studi su Sicurezza e Criminalita` (Italia)
• Fachhochschule fur Offentliche Verwaltung und Rechtspflege in Bayern (Alemania)
• Trilateral Research & Consulting LLP (Reino Unido)
• Politecnico di Milano (Italia)
• Service Public Federal Interieur (Be´lgica)
• Universita¨t des Saarlandes (Alemania)
• Direccio´n General de Polic´ıa - Ministerio del Interior (Espan˜a)
6.3 Objetivos
En este trabajo propondremos dos algoritmos capaces separar videos por fuente de
codificacio´n, concretamente por marca del dispositivo. Para ello, se siguieron algunos
pasos.
Investigacio´nr sobre y formatos de archivo de video
Disen˜o de una solucio´n
Evaluacio´n de la representacio´n del conjunto de datos
Evaluacio´n de algoritmos de clustering
Interpretacio´n de los resultados
6.4 Trabajos Relacionados
No hay mucho trabajo previo sobre el ana´lisis de contenedores de video, ya que no se
introdujo hasta 2014 en [GFK14]. Este documento presenta la informacio´n contenida en
los formatos de archivos de video MP4, MOV y AVI. No tiene un enfoque matema´tico y se
limita a exponer las diferencias entre dispositivos, y da cuenta de su potencial para fines
forenses de video.
Este primer trabajo, au´n en etapas muy tempranas, fue desarrollado por [SPC17] que
resulto´ en el art´ıculo [ISF+19], con el objetivo de verificar la integridad del video y la
identificacio´n y clasificacio´n de la fuente. Este u´ltimo art´ıculo fue la referencia de este
trabajo, ya que es la produccio´n ma´s desarrollada sobre este tema.
Incluso si el contenedor de video nunca se hab´ıa utilizado con fines forenses, existe una




El resto de este trabajo se divide en 5 cap´ıtulos ma´s:
Cap´ıtulo 2 comienza con una introduccio´n sobre co´mo funcionan los archivos de video,
y continua con una visio´n general sobre el ana´lisis forense de video. A partir de los
conceptos principales, se detallan algunas las te´cnicas desarrolladas para cubrir sus tres
a´reas principales: Adquisicio´n, Compresio´n y Compresio´n de video. Sin embargo, ninguna
de estas te´cnicas esta´ relacionada con los contenedores de video. A partir de este punto se
centra en el estado del arte del ana´lisis de contenedores de video. El trabajo de [ISF+19]
es el tema principal de este cap´ıtulo, ya que es uno de los pocos trabajos sobre el tema, y
el ma´s reciente y avanzado. Este trabajo es analizado y sera´ la base del pro´ximo cap´ıtulo.
El cap´ıtulo 3 contiene las propuestas del trabajo. En el se explica como reformulando
la base del trabajo [ISF+19] se pueden aplicar tecnicas de agrupamiento. Adema´s detalla
las te´cnicas utilizadas. Un paso importante´ es la eleccio´n de la representacion de los
video. Esas diferentes formas de abordar los datos son el nu´cleo de este trabajo, ya que la
representacio´n adecuada de los datos es crucial para la agrupacio´n sin supervisio´n. Para
finalizar, se proponen dos algoritmos para realizar el agrupamiento.
El cap´ıtulo 4 describe los experimentos realizados y sus resultados. Se divide en dos
fases. Comienza con un ana´lisis del conjunto de datos en diferentes representaciones
distintas. Para ello mediremos el coeficiente de silueta de las diferentes representaciones.
Para finalizar, los dos algoritmos de agrupacio´n se ponen a prueba utilizando las
representaciones ma´s prometedoras.
El Cap´ıtulo 5 concluye este trabajo, lo resume y define las posibles mejoras o
ampliaciones que podr´ıan realizarse en un futuro.

Chapter 7
Conclusiones y trabajo futuro
Este cap´ıtulo resume los hallazgos y logros de esta trabajo y establece l´ıneas de accio´n
para futuros trabajos.
7.1 Conclusiones
A lo largo de este documento, se ha mostrado co´mo la estructura del archivo de video
puede ser explotada para agrupar videos por fuente de datos, sin necesidad de entrenar un
clasificador. Se comprobo´ que la parte ma´s importante es el correcto procesamiento de los
datos antes del agrupamiento. Como se muestra en la seccio´n 4.3, la correcta preparacio´n
previa de los datos otorga la separacio´n necesaria necesaria para el agrupamiento. Este
mismo criterio tambie´n es aplicable a cualquier te´cnica futura que pretenda extraer
conclusiones del ana´lisis de archivos de video.
El uso de algoritmos simples tambie´n demostro´ ser eficaz al separar los archivos de
video por marca. Los resultados fueron positivos y se demostro´ que un algoritmo puede
agrupar correctamente los videos en grupos homoge´neos por marca, incluso si aparecen
muchos grupos. Otro algoritmo tambie´n presentaba una forma de mejorar el agrupamiento
en te´rminos generales, incluso si la propiedad interesante de homogeneidad.
7.2 Trabajo Futuro
En la misma direccio´n establecida por este trabajo, surgen algunas l´ıneas de desarrollo.
• Combinar elementos
Las representaciones de los videos pueden ser combinadas, buscando representaciones
alternativas que combinen fortalezas. Por ejemplo, combinar PathOrderField y
PathOrderFieldValue usando el primero solo para los campos que se espera que
tengan valores diferentes. O incluso desarrollando me´tricas que combinen mu´ltiples
representaciones.
• Aumentar el conjunto de datos
El conjunto de datos actual es muy limitado. La fuerza de la agrupacio´n no
supervisada esta´ en la capacidad de lidiar con elementos invisibles. Puede ser
u´til aumentar el taman˜o del conjunto de datos, tanto en la cantidad de videos por
dispositivo como en los dispositivos en s´ı, para validar los resultados obtenidos.
• Validacio´n cruzada para dispositivos desconocidos
Si se ampl´ıa el conjunto de datos, se puede usar la validacio´n cruzada para aumentar
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la confiabilidad de los resultados eliminando una de las clases a cada vez. Es
importante eliminar completamente el dispositivo, para simular que el dispositivo
sea completamente nuevo.
• Validacio´n de integridad o clasificacio´n
Las representaciones definidas de videos pueden ser adoptadas para otros problemas.
Por ejemplo, clasificacio´n, o validacio´n de integridad. No hay ninguna razo´n por la





Results of Silhouette Coefficient
Dataset Class Filter Metric Full Original
PathOrderFieldValue Brand No cosine 0,53515 0,368837
PathOrderFieldValue Brand No dice 0,534419 0,367728
PathOrderFieldValue Brand No dissimilarity 0,536545 0,370083
PathOrderFieldValue Brand No euclidean 0,331332 0,284307
PathOrderFieldValue Brand No hamming 0,523232 0,364287
PathOrderFieldValue Brand No jaccard 0,47348 0,372615
PathOrderFieldValue Brand No sokalsneath 0,388865 0,368889
PathOrderFieldValue Brand No yule 0,267601 0,414133
PathOrderFieldValue Brand Yes cosine 0,586047 0,625032
PathOrderFieldValue Brand Yes dice 0,584364 0,625443
PathOrderFieldValue Brand Yes dissimilarity 0,588605 0,624515
PathOrderFieldValue Brand Yes euclidean 0,38382 0,480236
PathOrderFieldValue Brand Yes hamming 0,573141 0,611083
PathOrderFieldValue Brand Yes jaccard 0,544168 0,609646
PathOrderFieldValue Brand Yes sokalsneath 0,482091 0,574963
PathOrderFieldValue Brand Yes yule 0,342589 0,530519
PathOrderFieldValue Device No cosine 0,470177 0,29106
PathOrderFieldValue Device No dice 0,470026 0,291339
PathOrderFieldValue Device No dissimilarity 0,470983 0,290757
PathOrderFieldValue Device No euclidean 0,29627 0,201258
PathOrderFieldValue Device No hamming 0,473966 0,293166
PathOrderFieldValue Device No jaccard 0,426687 0,276334
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PathOrderFieldValue Device No sokalsneath 0,358566 0,243252
PathOrderFieldValue Device No yule 0,288609 0,385987
PathOrderFieldValue Device Yes cosine 0,537889 0,250566
PathOrderFieldValue Device Yes dice 0,536964 0,249802
PathOrderFieldValue Device Yes dissimilarity 0,539669 0,251239
PathOrderFieldValue Device Yes euclidean 0,354567 0,180489
PathOrderFieldValue Device Yes hamming 0,539427 0,2464
PathOrderFieldValue Device Yes jaccard 0,512931 0,240534
PathOrderFieldValue Device Yes sokalsneath 0,467377 0,216695
PathOrderFieldValue Device Yes yule 0,39137 0,300273
PathOrderFieldValue Model No cosine 0,430461 0,494269
PathOrderFieldValue Model No dice 0,429383 0,495649
PathOrderFieldValue Model No dissimilarity 0,432278 0,492734
PathOrderFieldValue Model No euclidean 0,273198 0,33593
PathOrderFieldValue Model No hamming 0,430197 0,479556
PathOrderFieldValue Model No jaccard 0,391089 0,44988
PathOrderFieldValue Model No sokalsneath 0,330802 0,381149
PathOrderFieldValue Model No yule 0,225353 0,46679
PathOrderFieldValue Model Yes cosine 0,485664 0,416962
PathOrderFieldValue Model Yes dice 0,483662 0,41707
PathOrderFieldValue Model Yes dissimilarity 0,488659 0,416838
PathOrderFieldValue Model Yes euclidean 0,323058 0,305293
PathOrderFieldValue Model Yes hamming 0,483099 0,419467
PathOrderFieldValue Model Yes jaccard 0,462808 0,418572
PathOrderFieldValue Model Yes sokalsneath 0,423987 0,403479
PathOrderFieldValue Model Yes yule 0,314573 0,517986
PathOrderField Brand No cosine 0,760865 0,20602
PathOrderField Brand No dice 0,75796 0,205827
PathOrderField Brand No dissimilarity 0,765278 0,20625
PathOrderField Brand No euclidean 0,758168 0,239737
PathOrderField Brand No hamming 0,754566 0,205161
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PathOrderField Brand No jaccard 0,76165 0,210858
PathOrderField Brand No sokalsneath 0,757202 0,220384
PathOrderField Brand No yule 0,367526 -0,019762
PathOrderField Brand Yes cosine 0,725104 0,617741
PathOrderField Brand Yes dice 0,720333 0,617422
PathOrderField Brand Yes dissimilarity 0,731966 0,618083
PathOrderField Brand Yes euclidean 0,747372 0,67382
PathOrderField Brand Yes hamming 0,719411 0,605323
PathOrderField Brand Yes jaccard 0,730547 0,647518
PathOrderField Brand Yes sokalsneath 0,732937 0,661751
PathOrderField Brand Yes yule 0,215222 0,358059
PathOrderField Device No cosine 0,669923 0,219734
PathOrderField Device No dice 0,667933 0,21973
PathOrderField Device No dissimilarity 0,673406 0,219739
PathOrderField Device No euclidean 0,686581 0,239942
PathOrderField Device No hamming 0,675333 0,219474
PathOrderField Device No jaccard 0,674612 0,224072
PathOrderField Device No sokalsneath 0,680664 0,23195
PathOrderField Device No yule 0,253943 0,085106
PathOrderField Device Yes cosine 0,625299 0,228964
PathOrderField Device Yes dice 0,621511 0,228779
PathOrderField Device Yes dissimilarity 0,631153 0,229179
PathOrderField Device Yes euclidean 0,666356 0,259924
PathOrderField Device Yes hamming 0,631341 0,228002
PathOrderField Device Yes jaccard 0,634604 0,233376
PathOrderField Device Yes sokalsneath 0,648029 0,242164
PathOrderField Device Yes yule 0,093038 0,055203
PathOrderField Model No cosine 0,607844 0,612844
PathOrderField Model No dice 0,605562 0,612535
PathOrderField Model No dissimilarity 0,611665 0,613171
PathOrderField Model No euclidean 0,630161 0,665327
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PathOrderField Model No hamming 0,612583 0,600301
PathOrderField Model No jaccard 0,611593 0,64121
PathOrderField Model No sokalsneath 0,618012 0,655627
PathOrderField Model No yule 0,205808 0,531935
PathOrderField Model Yes cosine 0,563254 0,20292
PathOrderField Model Yes dice 0,559121 0,202918
PathOrderField Model Yes dissimilarity 0,569513 0,202922
PathOrderField Model Yes euclidean 0,609536 0,226282
PathOrderField Model Yes hamming 0,568651 0,202732
PathOrderField Model Yes jaccard 0,57137 0,207868
PathOrderField Model Yes sokalsneath 0,584939 0,216782
PathOrderField Model Yes yule 0,042782 0,028019
PathFieldValue Brand No cosine 0,441874 0,421472
PathFieldValue Brand No dice 0,442237 0,421195
PathFieldValue Brand No dissimilarity 0,442118 0,421756
PathFieldValue Brand No euclidean 0,259759 0,284369
PathFieldValue Brand No hamming 0,429031 0,42132
PathFieldValue Brand No jaccard 0,392508 0,40911
PathFieldValue Brand No sokalsneath 0,321512 0,386683
PathFieldValue Brand No yule 0,653203 0,559167
PathFieldValue Brand Yes cosine 0,490424 0,55874
PathFieldValue Brand Yes dice 0,490501 0,559707
PathFieldValue Brand Yes dissimilarity 0,49108 0,557682
PathFieldValue Brand Yes euclidean 0,307303 0,383603
PathFieldValue Brand Yes hamming 0,480587 0,556437
PathFieldValue Brand Yes jaccard 0,456325 0,539457
PathFieldValue Brand Yes sokalsneath 0,402169 0,50485
PathFieldValue Brand Yes yule 0,661963 0,686108
PathFieldValue Device No cosine 0,426858 0,282706
PathFieldValue Device No dice 0,426852 0,283189
PathFieldValue Device No dissimilarity 0,427514 0,282209
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PathFieldValue Device No euclidean 0,251006 0,180245
PathFieldValue Device No hamming 0,421543 0,284848
PathFieldValue Device No jaccard 0,382365 0,260756
PathFieldValue Device No sokalsneath 0,316657 0,226769
PathFieldValue Device No yule 0,655339 0,449343
PathFieldValue Device Yes cosine 0,492191 0,271416
PathFieldValue Device Yes dice 0,491913 0,27159
PathFieldValue Device Yes dissimilarity 0,493339 0,271226
PathFieldValue Device Yes euclidean 0,304278 0,174817
PathFieldValue Device Yes hamming 0,487856 0,272178
PathFieldValue Device Yes jaccard 0,462684 0,250766
PathFieldValue Device Yes sokalsneath 0,413705 0,218741
PathFieldValue Device Yes yule 0,696647 0,417425
PathFieldValue Model No cosine 0,407695 0,376446
PathFieldValue Model No dice 0,407434 0,37767
PathFieldValue Model No dissimilarity 0,408609 0,375146
PathFieldValue Model No euclidean 0,24136 0,238448
PathFieldValue Model No hamming 0,401229 0,373635
PathFieldValue Model No jaccard 0,36561 0,342924
PathFieldValue Model No sokalsneath 0,303518 0,292206
PathFieldValue Model No yule 0,615433 0,555977
PathFieldValue Model Yes cosine 0,466047 0,423723
PathFieldValue Model Yes dice 0,465294 0,424046
PathFieldValue Model Yes dissimilarity 0,467682 0,42339
PathFieldValue Model Yes euclidean 0,291929 0,278801
PathFieldValue Model Yes hamming 0,460221 0,425636
PathFieldValue Model Yes jaccard 0,438799 0,409287
PathFieldValue Model Yes sokalsneath 0,394033 0,383084
PathFieldValue Model Yes yule 0,647963 0,589758
PathField Brand No cosine 0,711387 0,036064
PathField Brand No dice 0,709286 0,036025
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PathField Brand No dissimilarity 0,719096 0,036105
PathField Brand No euclidean 0,726358 0,045549
PathField Brand No hamming 0,713778 0,03582
PathField Brand No jaccard 0,717522 0,036224
PathField Brand No sokalsneath 0,720447 0,036579
PathField Brand No yule 0,682742 -0,103007
PathField Brand Yes cosine 0,010912 0,355599
PathField Brand Yes dice 0,010528 0,355274
PathField Brand Yes dissimilarity 0,011245 0,355875
PathField Brand Yes euclidean 0,042902 0,398712
PathField Brand Yes hamming 0,006102 0,35239
PathField Brand Yes jaccard 0,010299 0,356251
PathField Brand Yes sokalsneath 0,010344 0,358512
PathField Brand Yes yule 0,250225 -0,011771
PathField Device No cosine 0,649546 0,223533
PathField Device No dice 0,647173 0,223479
PathField Device No dissimilarity 0,657656 0,22359
PathField Device No euclidean 0,668669 0,221577
PathField Device No hamming 0,656197 0,223113
PathField Device No jaccard 0,656811 0,223448
PathField Device No sokalsneath 0,661949 0,223388
PathField Device No yule 0,601839 0,000415
PathField Device Yes cosine -0,050331 0,270904
PathField Device Yes dice -0,050631 0,27079
PathField Device Yes dissimilarity -0,049993 0,271023
PathField Device Yes euclidean -0,044316 0,280359
PathField Device Yes hamming -0,05114 0,270286
PathField Device Yes jaccard -0,049942 0,270985
PathField Device Yes sokalsneath -0,048827 0,271344
PathField Device Yes yule -0,33778 -0,018232
PathField Model No cosine 0,597117 0,642781
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PathField Model No dice 0,594699 0,642565
PathField Model No dissimilarity 0,605274 0,642909
PathField Model No euclidean 0,622528 0,646994
PathField Model No hamming 0,603564 0,639245
PathField Model No jaccard 0,604256 0,642401
PathField Model No sokalsneath 0,609336 0,642292
PathField Model No yule 0,561265 0,185868
PathField Model Yes cosine -0,112228 0,086241
PathField Model Yes dice -0,112586 0,086238
PathField Model Yes dissimilarity -0,11183 0,086243
PathField Model Yes euclidean -0,104571 0,086335
PathField Model Yes hamming -0,113157 0,086214
PathField Model Yes jaccard -0,112109 0,086258
PathField Model Yes sokalsneath -0,111276 0,08629
PathField Model Yes yule -0,364412 -0,056916



















Elements Label Filter Metric threshold Size train AMI train Vmeasure traim Homogenity traim Completness traim Size test AMI test Vmeasure test Homogenity test Completness test
PathOrderField Model FALSE euclidean 0,1 27 0,8917380342 0,9021731049 0,9021997069 0,9021465044 24 0,8781267676 0,8961167813 0,8967777095 0,8954568267
PathOrderField Model FALSE sokalsneath 1,00E-05 27 0,8917380342 0,9021731049 0,9021997069 0,9021465044 24 0,8781267676 0,8961167813 0,8967777095 0,8954568267
PathOrderField Model FALSE jaccard 1,00E-05 27 0,8917380342 0,9021731049 0,9021997069 0,9021465044 24 0,8781267676 0,8961167813 0,8967777095 0,8954568267
PathField Model FALSE euclidean 0,1 26 0,8814711879 0,8968454845 0,8925405389 0,9011921591 23 0,8680131861 0,8903262939 0,8863336336 0,8943550884
PathField Model FALSE sokalsneath 1,00E-05 26 0,8814711879 0,8968454845 0,8925405389 0,9011921591 23 0,8680131861 0,8903262939 0,8863336336 0,8943550884
PathField Model FALSE dissimilarity 1,00E-05 26 0,8814711879 0,8968454845 0,8925405389 0,9011921591 23 0,8680131861 0,8903262939 0,8863336336 0,8943550884
PathFieldValue Brand TRUE yule 0,0007718807334 14 0,8086576767 0,8219536847 0,8299215379 0,8141373709 24 0,6240358894 0,7526446509 0,8953194854 0,6491918198
PathFieldValue Brand TRUE dice 0,1037681937 11 0,8066028984 0,8173397848 0,8111926075 0,8235808395 11 0,8127686271 0,8297444104 0,8383557252 0,8213082022
PathFieldValue Brand TRUE cosine 0,1037681937 11 0,8066028984 0,8173397848 0,8111926075 0,8235808395 11 0,8127686271 0,8297444104 0,8383557252 0,8213082022
PathOrderField Brand TRUE euclidean 3,874797474 16 0,8209141133 0,8702636465 0,9188945013 0,8265214698 14 0,8097760549 0,86398897 0,9134341435 0,8196219514
PathOrderField Brand TRUE sokalsneath 0,1502127605 16 0,8209141133 0,8702636465 0,9188945013 0,8265214698 14 0,8097760549 0,86398897 0,9134341435 0,8196219514
PathOrderField Brand TRUE jaccard 0,07862892341 16 0,8209141133 0,8702636465 0,9188945013 0,8265214698 14 0,8097760549 0,86398897 0,9134341435 0,8196219514
Table B.1: Results of looking for the adequate  for the full dataset with partition of 66% for train and 33% for test.
Elements Label Filter Metric threshold Size train AMI train Vmeasure traim Homogenity traim Completness traim Size test AMI test Vmeasure test Homogenity test Completness test
PathOrderField Brand TRUE euclidean 2,243882923 18 0,8644169415 0,8980196962 0,9312736086 0,867058767 13 0,6476037738 0,7767827312 0,8925518745 0,6875973729
PathOrderField Brand TRUE sokalsneath 0,0375229685 18 0,8644169415 0,8980196962 0,9312736086 0,867058767 13 0,6476037738 0,7767827312 0,8925518745 0,6875973729
PathOrderField Brand TRUE jaccard 0,01964141133 18 0,8644169415 0,8980196962 0,9312736086 0,867058767 13 0,6476037738 0,7767827312 0,8925518745 0,6875973729
PathOrderField Model FALSE euclidean 0,1 25 0,7954332156 0,8624530073 0,8182045255 0,9117610222 20 0,7170284199 0,8620895003 0,8101559335 0,9211373268
PathOrderField Model FALSE sokalsneath 1,00E-05 25 0,7954332156 0,8624530073 0,8182045255 0,9117610222 20 0,7170284199 0,8620895003 0,8101559335 0,9211373268
PathOrderField Model FALSE jaccard 1,00E-05 25 0,7954332156 0,8624530073 0,8182045255 0,9117610222 20 0,7170284199 0,8620895003 0,8101559335 0,9211373268
PathFieldValue Brand TRUE yule 0,0004641588834 26 0,8649806126 0,9298375507 1 0,8688751426 14 0,6218089143 0,6993416544 0,7292722503 0,671771009
PathFieldValue Brand TRUE dice 0,05688792333 29 0,8418285502 0,9170934554 1 0,8468814414 22 0,4972411581 0,7042159845 0,9223701703 0,5695168315
PathFieldValue Brand TRUE cosine 0,05688792333 29 0,8418285502 0,9170934554 1 0,8468814414 22 0,4972411581 0,7042159845 0,9223701703 0,5695168315
PathField Model FALSE euclidean 0,1 24 0,7846926658 0,8561388975 0,8077309428 0,9107190085 19 0,694938998 0,8505956101 0,7913610148 0,9194152639
PathField Model FALSE sokalsneath 1,00E-05 24 0,7846926658 0,8561388975 0,8077309428 0,9107190085 19 0,694938998 0,8505956101 0,7913610148 0,9194152639
PathField Model FALSE dissimilarity 1,00E-05 24 0,7846926658 0,8561388975 0,8077309428 0,9107190085 19 0,694938998 0,8505956101 0,7913610148 0,9194152639
Table B.2: Results of looking for the adequate  for the original videos in the dataset with partition of 66% for train (oversampled) and 33%
for test.
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Elements Label Filter Metric linkage threshold Size full AMI train Vmeasure train Homogenity train Completness train Size test AMI test Vmeasure test Homogenity test Completness test
PathOrderField Brand TRUE euclidean single 0,1 27 0,7672113227 0,8660872049 0,9779863042 0,7771655827 26 0,7606424703 0,8674586807 0,98061466 0,7777157923
PathOrderField Brand TRUE euclidean complete 0,1 27 0,7672113227 0,8660872049 0,9779863042 0,7771655827 26 0,7606424703 0,8674586807 0,98061466 0,7777157923
PathOrderField Brand TRUE euclidean average 0,1 27 0,7672113227 0,8660872049 0,9779863042 0,7771655827 26 0,7606424703 0,8674586807 0,98061466 0,7777157923
PathOrderField Brand TRUE euclidean weighted 0,1 27 0,7672113227 0,8660872049 0,9779863042 0,7771655827 26 0,7606424703 0,8674586807 0,98061466 0,7777157923
PathOrderField Brand TRUE sokalsneath single 0,1 27 0,7672113227 0,8660872049 0,9779863042 0,7771655827 26 0,7606424703 0,8674586807 0,98061466 0,7777157923
PathOrderField Brand TRUE sokalsneath complete 0,1 27 0,7672113227 0,8660872049 0,9779863042 0,7771655827 26 0,7606424703 0,8674586807 0,98061466 0,7777157923
PathOrderField Brand TRUE sokalsneath average 0,1 27 0,7672113227 0,8660872049 0,9779863042 0,7771655827 26 0,7606424703 0,8674586807 0,98061466 0,7777157923
PathOrderField Brand TRUE sokalsneath weighted 0,1 27 0,7672113227 0,8660872049 0,9779863042 0,7771655827 26 0,7606424703 0,8674586807 0,98061466 0,7777157923
PathOrderField Brand TRUE jaccard single 0,1 27 0,7672113227 0,8660872049 0,9779863042 0,7771655827 26 0,7606424703 0,8674586807 0,98061466 0,7777157923
PathOrderField Brand TRUE jaccard complete 0,1 27 0,7672113227 0,8660872049 0,9779863042 0,7771655827 26 0,7606424703 0,8674586807 0,98061466 0,7777157923
PathOrderField Brand TRUE jaccard average 0,1 27 0,7672113227 0,8660872049 0,9779863042 0,7771655827 26 0,7606424703 0,8674586807 0,98061466 0,7777157923
PathOrderField Brand TRUE jaccard weighted 0,1 27 0,7672113227 0,8660872049 0,9779863042 0,7771655827 26 0,7606424703 0,8674586807 0,98061466 0,7777157923
PathOrderField Model FALSE euclidean single 0,1 28 0,8918086828 0,9029119117 0,9035465971 0,9022781173 31 0,8736400726 0,9035085934 0,9146801084 0,892606674
PathOrderField Model FALSE euclidean complete 0,1 28 0,8918086828 0,9029119117 0,9035465971 0,9022781173 31 0,8736400726 0,9035085934 0,9146801084 0,892606674
PathOrderField Model FALSE euclidean average 0,1 28 0,8918086828 0,9029119117 0,9035465971 0,9022781173 31 0,8736400726 0,9035085934 0,9146801084 0,892606674
PathOrderField Model FALSE euclidean weighted 0,1 28 0,8918086828 0,9029119117 0,9035465971 0,9022781173 31 0,8736400726 0,9035085934 0,9146801084 0,892606674
PathOrderField Model FALSE sokalsneath single 0,1 28 0,8918086828 0,9029119117 0,9035465971 0,9022781173 31 0,8736400726 0,9035085934 0,9146801084 0,892606674
PathOrderField Model FALSE sokalsneath complete 0,1 28 0,8918086828 0,9029119117 0,9035465971 0,9022781173 31 0,8736400726 0,9035085934 0,9146801084 0,892606674
PathOrderField Model FALSE sokalsneath average 0,1 28 0,8918086828 0,9029119117 0,9035465971 0,9022781173 31 0,8736400726 0,9035085934 0,9146801084 0,892606674
PathOrderField Model FALSE sokalsneath weighted 0,1 28 0,8918086828 0,9029119117 0,9035465971 0,9022781173 31 0,8736400726 0,9035085934 0,9146801084 0,892606674
PathOrderField Model FALSE jaccard single 0,1 28 0,8918086828 0,9029119117 0,9035465971 0,9022781173 31 0,8736400726 0,9035085934 0,9146801084 0,892606674
PathOrderField Model FALSE jaccard complete 0,1 28 0,8918086828 0,9029119117 0,9035465971 0,9022781173 31 0,8736400726 0,9035085934 0,9146801084 0,892606674
PathOrderField Model FALSE jaccard average 0,1 28 0,8918086828 0,9029119117 0,9035465971 0,9022781173 31 0,8736400726 0,9035085934 0,9146801084 0,892606674
PathOrderField Model FALSE jaccard weighted 0,1 28 0,8918086828 0,9029119117 0,9035465971 0,9022781173 31 0,8736400726 0,9035085934 0,9146801084 0,892606674
PathFieldValue Brand TRUE yule single 1,14879084 303 0,3253678702 0,5858554822 0,9941127098 0,4153015302 145 0,3697587015 0,6310203274 0,9839463691 0,4644348667
PathFieldValue Brand TRUE yule complete 1,14879084 244 0,2590939357 0,5103760331 1 0,342620718 102 0,3307711478 0,5833533281 1 0,4117846317
PathFieldValue Brand TRUE yule average 1,14879084 223 0,2743852663 0,5178890615 0,9782954492 0,3521567146 150 0,2609567422 0,5330229499 0,9839463691 0,3655146972
PathFieldValue Brand TRUE yule weighted 1,14879084 216 0,2765069736 0,52161655 1 0,3528289971 141 0,2710790745 0,5421886301 1 0,3719196058
PathFieldValue Brand TRUE dice single 1,127739612 514 0,1772634985 0,468861464 1 0,3062175322 151 0,3573685412 0,6255635348 1 0,455141835
PathFieldValue Brand TRUE dice complete 1,14879084 206 0,2878835172 0,5310735398 0,9909315448 0,3627387054 101 0,3288212357 0,5799541733 0,9929730755 0,4095890221
PathFieldValue Brand TRUE dice average 1,14879084 261 0,2500306255 0,5025917305 0,991806296 0,336574356 147 0,2714405023 0,5444045959 1 0,3740081855
PathFieldValue Brand TRUE dice weighted 1,14879084 248 0,2527539959 0,5020310074 0,9833058709 0,3370589448 152 0,2633788962 0,5389134633 1 0,3688443153
PathFieldValue Brand TRUE cosine single 1,127739612 514 0,1772634985 0,468861464 1 0,3062175322 151 0,3573685412 0,6255635348 1 0,455141835
PathFieldValue Brand TRUE cosine complete 1,14879084 204 0,2885819094 0,531415036 0,9909315448 0,3630574161 101 0,3288212357 0,5799541733 0,9929730755 0,4095890221
PathFieldValue Brand TRUE cosine average 1,14879084 245 0,2581354115 0,5073490838 0,991806296 0,3408551474 153 0,264824424 0,540521834 1 0,3703528059
PathFieldValue Brand TRUE cosine weighted 1,14879084 235 0,2605972384 0,5070546532 0,9833058709 0,3416035051 149 0,2680494753 0,5420163042 1 0,3717574523
PathField Model FALSE euclidean single 0,1 27 0,882859057 0,897591477 0,893887429 0,90132635 30 0,8726395126 0,8978232813 0,9042360325 0,8915008468
PathField Model FALSE euclidean complete 0,1 27 0,882859057 0,897591477 0,893887429 0,90132635 30 0,8726395126 0,8978232813 0,9042360325 0,8915008468
PathField Model FALSE euclidean average 0,1 27 0,882859057 0,897591477 0,893887429 0,90132635 30 0,8726395126 0,8978232813 0,9042360325 0,8915008468
PathField Model FALSE euclidean weighted 0,1 27 0,882859057 0,897591477 0,893887429 0,90132635 30 0,8726395126 0,8978232813 0,9042360325 0,8915008468
PathField Model FALSE sokalsneath single 0,1 27 0,882859057 0,897591477 0,893887429 0,90132635 30 0,8726395126 0,8978232813 0,9042360325 0,8915008468
PathField Model FALSE sokalsneath complete 0,1 27 0,882859057 0,897591477 0,893887429 0,90132635 30 0,8726395126 0,8978232813 0,9042360325 0,8915008468
PathField Model FALSE sokalsneath average 0,1 27 0,882859057 0,897591477 0,893887429 0,90132635 30 0,8726395126 0,8978232813 0,9042360325 0,8915008468
PathField Model FALSE sokalsneath weighted 0,1 27 0,882859057 0,897591477 0,893887429 0,90132635 30 0,8726395126 0,8978232813 0,9042360325 0,8915008468
PathField Model FALSE dissimilarity single 0,1 27 0,882859057 0,897591477 0,893887429 0,90132635 30 0,8726395126 0,8978232813 0,9042360325 0,8915008468
PathField Model FALSE dissimilarity complete 0,1 27 0,882859057 0,897591477 0,893887429 0,90132635 30 0,8726395126 0,8978232813 0,9042360325 0,8915008468
PathField Model FALSE dissimilarity average 0,1 27 0,882859057 0,897591477 0,893887429 0,90132635 30 0,8726395126 0,8978232813 0,9042360325 0,8915008468
PathField Model FALSE dissimilarity weighted 0,1 27 0,882859057 0,897591477 0,893887429 0,90132635 30 0,8726395126 0,8978232813 0,9042360325 0,8915008468













Elements Label Filter Metric linkage threshold Size full AMI train Vmeasure train Homogenity train Completness train Size test AMI test Vmeasure test Homogenity test Completness test
PathOrderField Brand TRUE euclidean single 0,1 22 0,8394065406 0,8851085014 0,9312736086 0,8433042141 21 0,5718463822 0,7554844832 0,9396854295 0,6316632858
PathOrderField Brand TRUE euclidean complete 0,1 22 0,8394065406 0,8851085014 0,9312736086 0,8433042141 21 0,5718463822 0,7554844832 0,9396854295 0,6316632858
PathOrderField Brand TRUE euclidean average 0,1 22 0,8394065406 0,8851085014 0,9312736086 0,8433042141 21 0,5718463822 0,7554844832 0,9396854295 0,6316632858
PathOrderField Brand TRUE euclidean weighted 0,1 22 0,8394065406 0,8851085014 0,9312736086 0,8433042141 21 0,5718463822 0,7554844832 0,9396854295 0,6316632858
PathOrderField Brand TRUE sokalsneath single 0,1 22 0,8394065406 0,8851085014 0,9312736086 0,8433042141 21 0,5718463822 0,7554844832 0,9396854295 0,6316632858
PathOrderField Brand TRUE sokalsneath complete 0,1 22 0,8394065406 0,8851085014 0,9312736086 0,8433042141 21 0,5718463822 0,7554844832 0,9396854295 0,6316632858
PathOrderField Brand TRUE sokalsneath average 0,1 22 0,8394065406 0,8851085014 0,9312736086 0,8433042141 21 0,5718463822 0,7554844832 0,9396854295 0,6316632858
PathOrderField Brand TRUE sokalsneath weighted 0,1 22 0,8394065406 0,8851085014 0,9312736086 0,8433042141 21 0,5718463822 0,7554844832 0,9396854295 0,6316632858
PathOrderField Brand TRUE jaccard single 0,1 22 0,8394065406 0,8851085014 0,9312736086 0,8433042141 21 0,5718463822 0,7554844832 0,9396854295 0,6316632858
PathOrderField Brand TRUE jaccard complete 0,1 22 0,8394065406 0,8851085014 0,9312736086 0,8433042141 21 0,5718463822 0,7554844832 0,9396854295 0,6316632858
PathOrderField Brand TRUE jaccard average 0,1 22 0,8394065406 0,8851085014 0,9312736086 0,8433042141 21 0,5718463822 0,7554844832 0,9396854295 0,6316632858
PathOrderField Brand TRUE jaccard weighted 0,1 22 0,8394065406 0,8851085014 0,9312736086 0,8433042141 21 0,5718463822 0,7554844832 0,9396854295 0,6316632858
PathOrderField Model FALSE euclidean single 0,1 25 0,7954332156 0,8624530073 0,8182045255 0,9117610222 24 0,7392562074 0,8710043845 0,8316626412 0,9142530618
PathOrderField Model FALSE euclidean complete 0,1 25 0,7954332156 0,8624530073 0,8182045255 0,9117610222 24 0,7392562074 0,8710043845 0,8316626412 0,9142530618
PathOrderField Model FALSE euclidean average 0,1 25 0,7954332156 0,8624530073 0,8182045255 0,9117610222 24 0,7392562074 0,8710043845 0,8316626412 0,9142530618
PathOrderField Model FALSE euclidean weighted 0,1 25 0,7954332156 0,8624530073 0,8182045255 0,9117610222 24 0,7392562074 0,8710043845 0,8316626412 0,9142530618
PathOrderField Model FALSE sokalsneath single 0,1 25 0,7954332156 0,8624530073 0,8182045255 0,9117610222 24 0,7392562074 0,8710043845 0,8316626412 0,9142530618
PathOrderField Model FALSE sokalsneath complete 0,1 25 0,7954332156 0,8624530073 0,8182045255 0,9117610222 24 0,7392562074 0,8710043845 0,8316626412 0,9142530618
PathOrderField Model FALSE sokalsneath average 0,1 25 0,7954332156 0,8624530073 0,8182045255 0,9117610222 24 0,7392562074 0,8710043845 0,8316626412 0,9142530618
PathOrderField Model FALSE sokalsneath weighted 0,1 25 0,7954332156 0,8624530073 0,8182045255 0,9117610222 24 0,7392562074 0,8710043845 0,8316626412 0,9142530618
PathOrderField Model FALSE jaccard single 0,1 25 0,7954332156 0,8624530073 0,8182045255 0,9117610222 24 0,7392562074 0,8710043845 0,8316626412 0,9142530618
PathOrderField Model FALSE jaccard complete 0,1 25 0,7954332156 0,8624530073 0,8182045255 0,9117610222 24 0,7392562074 0,8710043845 0,8316626412 0,9142530618
PathOrderField Model FALSE jaccard average 0,1 25 0,7954332156 0,8624530073 0,8182045255 0,9117610222 24 0,7392562074 0,8710043845 0,8316626412 0,9142530618
PathOrderField Model FALSE jaccard weighted 0,1 25 0,7954332156 0,8624530073 0,8182045255 0,9117610222 24 0,7392562074 0,8710043845 0,8316626412 0,9142530618
PathFieldValue Brand TRUE yule single 1,14879084 249 0,3883109338 0,6362897978 1 0,4665872535 48 0,3849381779 0,659405752 0,9551710435 0,5034990692
PathFieldValue Brand TRUE yule complete 1,14879084 209 0,4025091913 0,6429987812 1 0,4738380278 42 0,4037991826 0,6793090234 1 0,5143587981
PathFieldValue Brand TRUE yule average 1,14879084 202 0,410605319 0,647418245 1 0,4786536877 42 0,4123070073 0,6853124522 1 0,5212740118
PathFieldValue Brand TRUE yule weighted 1,14879084 212 0,4024445483 0,6430262622 1 0,4738678755 43 0,4096934889 0,6841534763 1 0,5199340987
PathFieldValue Brand TRUE dice single 1,127739612 247 0,3889186365 0,6365477404 1 0,4668647075 51 0,3806830545 0,6692646712 1 0,5029284612
PathFieldValue Brand TRUE dice complete 1,14879084 208 0,4027882446 0,6431116404 1 0,4739606142 40 0,3960781483 0,6636707892 0,9655462209 0,5055971871
PathFieldValue Brand TRUE dice average 1,14879084 198 0,4132766477 0,6490865071 1 0,480479698 42 0,4339877868 0,6998975424 1 0,5383402964
PathFieldValue Brand TRUE dice weighted 1,14879084 208 0,4036484522 0,6435449659 1 0,4744314775 40 0,4419582295 0,7037669303 1 0,5429323991
PathFieldValue Brand TRUE cosine single 1,127739612 247 0,3889186365 0,6365477404 1 0,4668647075 51 0,3806830545 0,6692646712 1 0,5029284612
PathFieldValue Brand TRUE cosine complete 1,14879084 208 0,4027882446 0,6431116404 1 0,4739606142 40 0,3960781483 0,6636707892 0,9655462209 0,5055971871
PathFieldValue Brand TRUE cosine average 1,14879084 198 0,4132766477 0,6490865071 1 0,480479698 42 0,4339877868 0,6998975424 1 0,5383402964
PathFieldValue Brand TRUE cosine weighted 1,14879084 208 0,4036484522 0,6435449659 1 0,4744314775 40 0,4419582295 0,7037669303 1 0,5429323991
PathField Model FALSE euclidean single 0,1 24 0,7846926658 0,8561388975 0,8077309428 0,9107190085 23 0,7158788326 0,8597823562 0,8128677226 0,9124440332
PathField Model FALSE euclidean complete 0,1 24 0,7846926658 0,8561388975 0,8077309428 0,9107190085 23 0,7158788326 0,8597823562 0,8128677226 0,9124440332
PathField Model FALSE euclidean average 0,1 24 0,7846926658 0,8561388975 0,8077309428 0,9107190085 23 0,7158788326 0,8597823562 0,8128677226 0,9124440332
PathField Model FALSE euclidean weighted 0,1 24 0,7846926658 0,8561388975 0,8077309428 0,9107190085 23 0,7158788326 0,8597823562 0,8128677226 0,9124440332
PathField Model FALSE sokalsneath single 0,1 24 0,7846926658 0,8561388975 0,8077309428 0,9107190085 23 0,7158788326 0,8597823562 0,8128677226 0,9124440332
PathField Model FALSE sokalsneath complete 0,1 24 0,7846926658 0,8561388975 0,8077309428 0,9107190085 23 0,7158788326 0,8597823562 0,8128677226 0,9124440332
PathField Model FALSE sokalsneath average 0,1 24 0,7846926658 0,8561388975 0,8077309428 0,9107190085 23 0,7158788326 0,8597823562 0,8128677226 0,9124440332
PathField Model FALSE sokalsneath weighted 0,1 24 0,7846926658 0,8561388975 0,8077309428 0,9107190085 23 0,7158788326 0,8597823562 0,8128677226 0,9124440332
PathField Model FALSE dissimilarity single 0,1 24 0,7846926658 0,8561388975 0,8077309428 0,9107190085 23 0,7158788326 0,8597823562 0,8128677226 0,9124440332
PathField Model FALSE dissimilarity complete 0,1 24 0,7846926658 0,8561388975 0,8077309428 0,9107190085 23 0,7158788326 0,8597823562 0,8128677226 0,9124440332
PathField Model FALSE dissimilarity average 0,1 24 0,7846926658 0,8561388975 0,8077309428 0,9107190085 23 0,7158788326 0,8597823562 0,8128677226 0,9124440332
PathField Model FALSE dissimilarity weighted 0,1 24 0,7846926658 0,8561388975 0,8077309428 0,9107190085 23 0,7158788326 0,8597823562 0,8128677226 0,9124440332
Table 2: Results of looking for the adequate inconsistency threshold for the original videos in the dataset with partition of 66% for train
(oversampled) and 33% for test.
Bibliography
[ACDM+17] I. Amerini, R. Caldelli, A. Del Mastio, A. Di Fuccia, C. Molinari, and A. P. Rizzo.
Dealing with video source identification in social networks. Signal Processing: Image
Communication, 57:1–7, 2017.
[Ale] Alexa. The top 500 sites on the web. https://www.alexa.com/topsites.
[APA18] APACHE. https://github.com/sannies/mp4parser, Jul 2018.
[App16] Apple. QuickTime File Format Specification: Overview. https://developer.apple.
com/library/archive/documentation/QuickTime/QTFF/QTFFChap1/qtff1.html, Sep
2016.
[Asl18] S. Aslam. YouTube by the Numbers: Stats, Demographics Fun Facts.
=https://www.omnicoreagency.com/youtube-statistics/, Dec 2018.
[Bec15] M Beck. Reversal of Facebook: photo posts now drive lowest organic reach, Feb 2015.
[BS15] D. J. Balding and C. D. Steele. Weight-of-evidednce for forensic DNA profiles. John
Wiley Sons, May 2015.
[Cis18] Cisco. Cisco Visual Networking Index: Forecast and Trends, 2017–2022.
https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/solutions/collateral/service-provider/
visual-networking-index-vni/white-paper-c11-741490.html, Nov 2018.
[COF12] V. Conotter, J.F. O’Brien, and H. Farid. Exposing digital forgeries in ballistic motion.
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Transactions on Information Forensics
and Security, 7(1):283–296, 2012.
[EKSX96] M. Ester, H. Kriegel, J. Sander, and X. Xiaowei. A density-based algorithm for
discovering clusters in large spatial databases with noise. In Proceedings of the Second
International Conference on Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining, pages 226–231,
Portland, Oregon, August 1996.
[FDQ00] Z. Fan and R. De Queiroz. Maximum likelihood estimation of JPEG quantization table
in the identification of bitmap compression history. In Proceedings 2000 International
Conference on Image Processing (Cat. No. 00CH37101), volume 1, pages 948–951,
September 2000.
[FDQ03] Z. Fan and R. L. De Queiroz. Identification of bitmap compression history: JPEG
detection and quantizer estimation. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers
Transactions on Image Processing, 12(2):230–235, April 2003.
[FSS07] Dongdong Fu, Yun Q Shi, and Wei Su. A generalized Benford’s law for JPEG coefficients
and its applications in image forensics. In Security, Steganography, and Watermarking of
Multimedia Contents nine, volume 6505, San Jose, CA, United States, February 2007.
[GFK14] T. Gloe, A. Fischer, and M. Kirchner. Forensic analysis of video file formats. Digital
Investigation, 11:68–76, 2014.
[HHLH08] Chih-Chung Hsu, Tzu-Yi Hung, Chia-Wen Lin, and Chiou-Ting Hsu. Video forgery
detection using correlation of noise residue. In Institute of Electrical and Electronics




[HLWT06] Junfeng He, Zhouchen Lin, Lifeng Wang, and Xiaoou Tang. Detecting doctored JPEG
images via DCT coefficient analysis. In European conference on computer vision, volume
3953, pages 423–435, Graz, Austria, May 2006.
[Int15] International Organization for Standardization. ISO/IEC 14496-2:2004: Coding of
audio-visual objects – Part 2: Visual. https://www.iso.org/standard/39259.html,
August 2015.
[Int17] International Organization for Standardization. ISO/IEC 14496-12:2015: Coding of
audio-visual objects – Part 12: ISO base media file format. https://www.iso.org/
standard/68960.html, Aug 2017.
[ISF+19] M. Iuliani, D. Shullani, M. Fontani, S. Meucci, and A. Piva. A Video Forensic
Framework for the Unsupervised Analysis of MP4-Like File Container. Institute of
Electrical and Electronics Engineers Transactions on Information Forensics and Security,
14(3):635–645, 2019.
[MCP+07] N. Mondaini, R. Caldelli, A. Piva, M. Barni, and V. Cappellini. Detection of malevolent
changes in digital video for forensic applications. In Security, steganography, and
watermarking of multimedia contents nine, volume 6505, San Jose, CA, United States,
January 2007.
[MFB+12] S. Milani, M. Fontani, P. Bestagini, M. Barni, A. Piva, M. Tagliasacchi, and
S. Tubaro. An overview on video forensics. Asia-Pacific Signal and Information
Processing Association Transactions on Signal and Information Processing, 1:1229–1233,
2012.
[MKR99] M. K. Mihcak, I. Kozintsev, and K. Ramchandran. Spatially adaptive statistical
modeling of wavelet image coefficients and its application to denoising. In Acoustics,
Speech, and Signal Processing, 1999. Proceedings., 1999 IEEE International Conference
on, volume 6, pages 3253–3256, March 1999.
[nas92] The effects of video compression on acceptability of images for monitoring life sciences
experiments. Technical Report, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, July
1992.
[oDE16] Scientific Working Group on Digital Evidence. SWGDE Digital Multimedia
Evidence Glossary. https://www.swgde.org/documents/Current%20Documents/
SWGDE%20Digital%20and%20Multimedia%20Evidence%20Glossary, June 2016.
[RVBV16] S. Romano, N. X. Vinh, J. Bailey, and K. Verspoor. Adjusting for chance clustering
comparison measures. The Journal of Machine Learning Research, 17:4635–4666, 2016.
[Sci17] Scientific Working Group on Digital Evidence. Swgde technical overview of
digital video files. https://www.swgde.org/documents/Current%20Documents/SWGDE%
20Technical%20Overview%20of%20Digital%20Video%20Files, August 2017.




[SPC17] D. Shullani, A. Piva, and L. Chisci. Video forensic tools exploiting features from
video-container to video-encoder level. PhD Thesis, Dipartamento di Ingenieria
dell’Informazione, Universita Degli Studi Firenze, Italia, April 2017.
[VEB10] N. X. Vinh, J. Epps, and J. Bailey. Information theoretic measures for clusterings
comparison: Variants, properties, normalization and correction for chance. Journal of
Machine Learning Research, 11:2837–2854, January 2010.
[vis17] VISION: a video and image dataset for source identification. European Association for
Signal Processing Journal on Information Security, 2017(1):150, Oct 2017.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 73
[VTT10] G. Valenzise, M. Tagliasacchi, and S. Tubaro. Estimating QP and motion vectors in
H. 264/AVC video from decoded pixels. In Proceedings of the second Association for
Computing Machinery workshop on Multimedia in forensics, security and intelligence,
pages 89–92, 978-1-4503-0157-2, October 2010.
[WF06] W. Wang and H. Farid. Exposing digital forgeries in video by detecting double MPEG
compression. In Proceedings of the eighth Association for Computing Machinery workshop
on Multimedia and security, pages 37–47, Geneva, Switzerland, September 2006.
[WF09] W. Wang and H. Farid. Exposing digital forgeries in video by detecting double
quantization. In Proceedings of the eleventh Association for Computing Machinery
workshop on Multimedia and security, pages 39–48, Princeton, NJ, United States,
September 2009.
[ZSZ09] J. Zhang, Y. Su, and M. Zhang. Exposing digital video forgery by ghost shadow artifact.
In Proceedings of the First Association for Computing Machinery workshop on Multimedia
in forensics, pages 49–54, October 2009.
